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The rapid growth in recent years in the number of workers' 
cooperatives in Western Europe, and the development of various 
schemes for workers' participation in business decision-making 
has been paralleled by an equally dramatic increase in the number 
of academic publications on the subject. To date this literature 
has been very largely theoretical or descriptive, but some 
significant empirical studies on West European producer cooperatives 
are beginning to emerge. 
This survey consists of two broad sections: a review of 
the literature on the labour-managed firm, and a bibliography. 
The review gives a general sketch of the material contained in 
the bibliography, and is divided into two sections, covering 
first the theoretical literature and thereafter West European 
experience. 
The bibliography on the labour-managed firm is divided 
into sections broadly parallel to those of the review. It is 
arranged in two sections, covering articles and books separately. 
The large theoretical literature which has appeared in article 
form has been classified by broad subject grouping. Material 
available on European experience is arranged first by region 
and then by individual country. 
The rapid growth in recent years in the number of 
workers: cooperatives in Western Europe, and the development of 
various schemes for workers' participation in business decision 
making has been paralleled by an equally dramatic increase in the 
number of academic publications on the subject. To date this 
liter11~ure has been very largely theoretical or descriptive, but 
some significant empirical studies on west European producer 
cooperatives are beginning to emerge, and the case of the Yugoslav 
self-management system has been fa·irly well documented and has 
provided a fruitful ground for applied research. With regard to 
the economics of labour-management and employee participation the 
emphasis of this literature on microeconomic issues and a partial 
equilibrium approach is clearly apparent. However, it may be 
expected that in the future this imbalance will be rectified as 
the larger context of economy-wide inter-relations attracts more 
interest.The recent debate on the macroeconomic effects of profit-
sharing schemes represents a valuable contribution to the 
literature which should stimulate further work at the macro-level. 
At the other extreme, an area of growing interest lies in the 
internal organization of the firm and issues surround!"g the 
degree of participation or conflict, within differing forms of 
work organization,and the impact of intra-enterprise variables on 
enterprise performance. Most of the recent empirical work has 
focused on these issues,and is helping to broaden our understand-
ing of the small but rapidly growing producer cooperative sector 
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in Western European mixed economies. In our review of the litera-
ture on the European experience therefore,we have concentrated our 
attention on studies of the labour-managed firm in its various 
forms,rather than the more diffuse experience with employee par-
ticipation and profit sharing schemes within the private sector. 
In the introductory review we have tried to give a general sketch 
of the material contained in each section, and we do not refer to 
every item in any section. The reader should therefore use the 
bibliography,which is divided into sections broadly parallel to 
those of the review, as a tool to broaden and deepen his or her 
understanding of issues of particular interest. 
can 
on 
from 
An extensive bibliography on cooperatives of all types 
be found in Hill, McGrath and Reyes(l981)•,and the literature 
employee participation in private firms has already benefited 
an excellent bibliographical treatment by Pettman (1979)••, 
and we have therefore concentrated our search on these topics on 
subsequent years.The bibliography is arranged in two sections, 
covering articles and books separately.The large theoretical 
literature which has appeared in article form has been classified 
by broad subject grouping. The monographic literature has tended 
to be largely of an applied and case-study nature, and material of 
this type is arranged first by region and th~~ by individual 
country. 
*Patricia M.Hill,Maryjean 1~cGrath and Ele!'la 
Reyes(l981) ,Ccoperati•te 3ibliooraph•t - an Annotated Guide to 'llorks 
in English on ·cooperatives & Cooperation,University Centre for 
Cooperatives,University of Wisconsin,Madison. 
**Barrie o. Pettman,(l978),Industrial Democracy: A Selected 
Bibliographv, MCB Publications, Bradford,West Yorkshire, 
Bibliography no. 11 from the Institute of Scientific Business. 
Explanation 
The form of citation we have used throughout is as in 
the following examples (where full information is available): 
l)Articles: 
Author Title Journal 
CARSON,R.G. 
''A theory of cooperatives'', Canadian Journal of Economics, 
(1977)' 10, 4, 565-89 
Year Volume Number Page reference 
2) Books 
\ 
lst author 2nd author Title Publisher 
DUMAS,A. DAURES,N. 
"Theorie Economique de l'Autogestion", Faubourg, 
Paris,l977 
Place of publication Date 
The bibliography has been prepared using the POWER+ 
programme of the EUI's Prime Computer and we are grateful to Bob 
Danziger for his patient assistance and explanation in the setting 
up and implementation of the programme. We are also grateful to 
Maren Ipsen and Michael Tegelaars of the EUI Library for their 
advice and cooperation in our search for the items contained in 
the bibliography,and to Sheila Marnie for research assistance. 
The research was undertaken within the EC-funded re-
search project:"The impact of workers' participation schemes on 
enterprise performance in Western Europe",directed by 
Prof.D.M.~uti at the European University Institute,l984-1986. We 
we would like to thank Professor Nuti for his encouragement and 
support, although ~e are alone responsible for any errors or 
ommissions in this review. 
-2-
Part 1. Theoretical oerspectives. 
1. Theory of the labour managed firm- the basic model 
The theory of the labour managed firm has been developed 
to describe the bahaviour of both producer cooperatives in mixed 
economies such as those of western Europe, and the self-managed 
socialist firms which are today found exclusively in Yugoslavia, 
although the introduction of similar organizational structures is 
an ostensible aim of recent economic reforms in Hungary also. 
Traditionally, the labour-managed firm has been distinguished 
through the specification of its 'objective function' which is 
taken to be the maximization of income per head of the labour 
force, (where income is given by revenue less depreciation and in-
terest costs of capital and any fixed costs or taxes). Thi~ 
contrasts with the objective imputed to the privately owned 
'entrepreneurial' or 'capitalist' firm which is the maximization 
of absolute profit. The assumption of income-per-head maximization 
derives from a fundamental feature of the labour-managed firm, 
namely that it is the workers themselves, either directly or 
through a workers' council, who excercise control over all areas 
of the firm's activities. In contrast, the assumption of profit 
maximization derives from the decision making control excercised 
by an owner-manager, or by a hired manag~r acting on behalf of ex-
ternal owners. The theory of the labour managed firm was initially 
elaborated by 'Nard(89) and Vanek(428,429). Equilibrium levels of 
output and employment in such firms are found to be identical to 
\ 
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that of 'twin' capitalist firms (defined on the same technology 
and market conditions) so long as competition has driven economic 
profits 
zero. 
managed 
(revenue less opportunity costs of factor inputs) down to 
However, whenever economic profits are positive, the labour 
firm will employ less labour and produce less output than 
its profit-maximizing twin (and conversely when economic profits 
are negative). Moreover, as demand conditions improve, and prices 
rise, the labor managed firm will, in the short run with capital 
stock fixed, reduce output by dismissing some workers. The reason 
is that an equilibrium is found at a point where the cost of 
employing an additional '"orker (average income per head) is just 
equal to the amount he contributes to total revenue (the value of 
labour marginal product). Any addition to employment then reduces 
the value of the labour marginal product due to diminishing 
returns, which in turn pulls down average income, but not by so 
much. This opens up a gap between average income and marginal 
product which is the measure of the loss in income to existing 
members of admitting a new member-worker. As prices rise, a 
similar gap is opened bet•.,een average income and marginal product, 
since due to the presence of fixed capital costs, average income 
rises more than proprtionately to the rise in the value of labour 
marginal product. At the existing level of employment, marginal 
members are inflicting a net cost on the firm in the sense that 
income per head could be higher at a lower level of employment. If 
the labour-managed firm takes this fact into account, and . ,ere to 
apply the income per head maximization rule ruthlessly, it would 
-4-
dismiss workers and reduce output - a 'perverse' response to a 
market signal indicating an increase in demand for the product. 
In the long run,with capital inputs adjustable too, the 
increase in the value of the marginal product of capital above its 
rental,or opportunity cost, would induce an expansion of the capi-
tal stock. If there were strong complementarity between capital 
and labour inputs, so that the increase in the capital stock 
(given labour input) raised labour marginal productivity suffi-
ciently (a feedback effect), then this may be sufficient to offset 
the 'short run' effect, and cause labour marginal productivity to 
rise by more than average income per head (at the initial level of 
employment). Marginal workers would then have a net value for the 
firm and employment and ouput would rise along with capital stock. 
Thus in general the long run supply response is indeterminate -
output rising or falling '"ith product price according to the rela-
tive strengths of the various 'short run' and 'long run' effects 
involved. In any event, however, due to the unambiguously restric-
tive 'short run' effect, the supply response of the labour-managed 
firm will be less elastic than that of a privately owned private 
firm, which takes labour remuneration as a cost in its profit-
maximization programme. The technical aspects of these processes 
are worked out in detail by Ward(89)and Vanek(428) and sub-
sequently elaborated by Maurice and Ferguson(59), Landsberger and 
Subotnik(SS), Estrin (30,31) Fukuda(36) and Ireland and Law(48). 
Since the labour-managed firm, even in the long run does 
not adjust fully to market price signals, entry of new firms (and 
exit of less productive firms) is necessary to fully eliminate 
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economic profits and losses, and bring about an efficient alloca-
tion of resources throughout the economy. As Meade (62,63,64) has 
forcefully emphasised, however, this requires some mechanism 
whereby unemployed workers, and 'o'IOrkers in less productive en-
terprises may associate to set up new cooperatives, which would 
require extensive state involvement.Me~de regards the involvement 
of the state in the entry process with a sort of horror. However 
as Conte(l9) has observed the obstacles to the formation of new 
firms are essentially problems of information and uncertainty as 
to the legislative climate. In countries where specific legisla-
tion and quasi-state support organizations have been established, 
such as in Italy and the United Kingdom, formation of new coopera-
tives appears to be a reasonably straightforward matter. Indeed 
even for private enterprise such 'state intervention' is a normal 
requirement for new entry of small firms. Examples are the small-
firm information services and enterprise development schemes in 
the United Kingdom. It should be emphasised therefore,that if this 
problem were to be solved satisfactorily, a competitive labour-
managed economy would be just as efficient and give rise to the 
same 'general equilibrium' allocation of resources as a competi-
tive economy operating under private ownership and pursuing 
profit-maximization as an enterprise goal 
Dreze,26,27,28; Pearce,72); '"ith however the important difference 
that the general equilibrium so attained may be unstable and re-
quire central intervention in the form of offsetting adjustments 
of capital charges or rentals, should an inflationary process 
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develop,(Greenwald,4l;Bartlett and Weinrich, 8).The recent ex- most obvious point is that members of any reasonably ·~ell 
perience of the self-managed economy of Yugoslavia with rapid and specified cooperative work community ·~ould naturally be most un-
accelerating inflation indicates the importance of stability con- likely to sack fellow members for the sake of a marginal monetary 
siderations of this type. In addition Greenberg(40)and gain to remaining members (Robinson,74;McCain,60; Jossa,53). This 
Ichiishi(45,46,47) show that a more general equilibrium concept is point has been formalized in two distinct approaches. Firstly, 
required to fully account for the fact that labour, unlike other when dismissals take place randomly, so that at the moment of 
'commodities' is not infinitely divisible. Developing the concept taking a decision on labour force adjustment no individual member 
of a coalitional equilibrium they explore the ways in which the knows exactly who will be fired, it is natural that each member 
general equilibrium of a labour managed economy differs from that takes into account the probability that he himself will be among 
of a private ownership economy when a more realistic treatment of those to be dismissed. In these circumstances the appropriate ob-
labour input is considered. jective of the decision makers will be the expected utility of 
Given appropriate macroeconomic policy to maintain ef- income per worker. Steinherr and Thisse(83,84) demonstrate that 
fective demand and aggregate employment, and to offset any such a procedure will lead to no labour force adjustment at all 
inflationary tendencies,the major problems with the labour-managed taking place following a small increase in price, a result which 
economy relate essentially to the problem of short run adjustment has been extended to the case of a diversified firm by Brewer and 
to price signals (and to problems of finance and investment which Browning(l4). Secondly, if following Meade's (62) proposal, equal 
we consider below). Despite the long run efficiency of the system, treatment requires that no member would be dismissed against his 
in the short run (before offsetting entry and exit has had a will, then some form of compensation would have to be paid to dis-
chance to take effect),labour may well be directed away, rather missed workers to persaude them to quit voluntarily. 
than towards, its most productive uses. This would be a par- However,Ireland and Law(48), Steinherr and Thisse(83,84),and 
ticularly serious problem for a producer cooperative sector in an Bonin(l2) demonstrate that such compensation is not feasible. This 
expanding mixed economy since the cooperative sector would suffer 
\ 
is due to the fact that total enterprise income woul~ b~ reduced 
a continuous loss in market share relative to its capitalist corn- by the possible membership reduction, and the compensation pay-
petitors (Montias,66). ments required would reduce the income of remaining members below 
A large component of the theoretical literature has that ·~hich could be achieved in the absence of a membership 
therefore been devoted to a critical examination of this fundamen- reduction. In either case the firm would not reduce employment 
tal paradox of the Ward-Vanek labour-managed firm. The first and following a price increase and the perverse supply response 
I 
L 
r 
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vanishes, although not the problem of supply over time as natural wastage took place. The cooperative would 
inelasticity.Howeyer,the labour-managed firm is then left in a 'degenerate' into a firm owned privately by the remaining members. 
situation of disequilibrium, and Nuti(68,69) has suggested that a However,hired workers could presumably not be kept out of the 
process of merger between 'labour surplus' and 'labour hungry' decision making process indefinitely (Meade,64), and would even-
cooperatives would ensue in order to take advantage of the gains tually have to be admitted to full membership. Indeed,open access 
available from a feasible reallocation of labour through the in- to membership for hired workers is a feature of most western 
ternalization of the adjustment process, leading to a steady European cooperatives (see Part 2 below), and in Italy for ex-
increase in industrial concentration. (A process of this type ap- ample, one often hears that the cooperatives would like more hired 
pears to have recently taken place among the construction sector workers to take up membership than currently do so, and not that 
cooperatives of the Emilia-Romagna region in Italy).New firm for- there is any attempt to restrict membership size within the exist-
mation would then be continuously necessary to restore long run ing workforce. The economic analysis of this case is a complicated 
competitive equilibrium. Alternatively, enterprise equilibrium dynamic problem and remains to be fully analysed in the theoreti-
would be achieved through natural wastage, and the Ward-type short cal literature,although Sapir(78) provides a thorough treatment of 
run supply perversity would persist. a related case where members and non-members are distinguished by 
A further possibility, frequently observed in practice, their level of training, however wage-workers are not free to be-
is that the cooperative could hire salaried workers,whenever come full members until a preliminary period of basic training has 
average incomes in the cooperative were above the goir.g wage,thus elapsed .. 
augmenting the incomes of the full time members by the excess of various solutions to the adjustment problems of a 
the additional net revenue over the salaried workers wage bill labour-managed economy have been proposed in addition to the 
(Dubravcic,29; Gal-Or et. al.,93; Sapir,78- see also de Meza,2l). promotion of exit and entry. They essentially involve either some 
Supply response would then be identical to that of a private firm form of ir.direct state intervention through fiscal policy or 
employing wage labour as a price increase would raise the value of decentralized planning mechanisms, or a modification of the 
labour marginal product above its marginal cost (the wage rate) principle of egalitarian distribution within cooperative firms 
and employment would be increased. However this solution may tend themselves. Examples of fiscal policies - lump-sum or ad valorem 
to undermine the institutional features of the cooperative over taxes which would induce efficient responses to price signals 
time, since,as Ben-Ner(9) and Miyazaki(67) argue,there would be a have been discussed by Suckling(86) and Vanek,Pienkos and 
temptation to substitute hired workers for full member-workers Steinherr(ll6). However the efficacy of this measure would require 
r 
I 
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a large amount· of information on individual firms cost and produc-
tion conditions and so there would be obvious problems of 
implementation. A more decentralized mechanism which would take 
advantage of the operation of market forces is the 'Enterprise 
Incentive Fund' proposal of Ireland and Law(48). A central 
authority would estimate a shadow price for labour which would ap-
proximate the market-clearing wage rate, and establish a fund 
which would make payments to firms which were making an accounting 
profit in terms of the shadow wage so long as they took on new 
member-workers; and to firms who were making an accounting loss 
and displacing member-workers. Firms which tcok the opposite ac-
tior.s would make a payment to the Incentive Fund. The major 
difficulties with the proposal are that the fund would not neces-
sarily be self-financing,especially in view of the fact that 
displaced workers would require compensation, and so lump sum 
taxes would be required to make up any financial short-fall. If 
t~ese were to be firm-specific the same information problems that 
apply to the use of direct fiscal instruments would arise. 
Secondly, the scheme requires truthful revelation of the each 
firm's accounting profits and losses, a procedure which is corn-
monly found to be open to abuse even in centrally planned 
economies. Some aspects of the truthful revelation of enterprise \ 
performance in the context of labour-managed nationalized in-
dustries have been discussed in Guesnerie and Laffonr(42). A more 
direct planning method would involve iF stat'e empl~~ent <!gertcy 
directing workers from low productivity to high productivity 
cooperatives (~1eade,l04), but this wou!d clearly undermine the 
: I ILL __ 
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autonomy of the individual cooperative and turn it into something 
approaching a nationalised industry. Nevertheless, something 
similar appears to have taken place in Yugoslavia, where 'self-
management planning agreements' stipulate target rates of growth 
of employment by self-managed firms (Bartlett,361). 
However,since these targets are neither firm- nor sector-specific 
it would appear that the system is intended more as a broad 
employment creation measure in conditions of high unemployment 
than as a means of overcoming the allocation problem itself. 
A second possibility is to abandon the egalitarian dis-
tribution principle and so take advantage of the intra-marginal 
producer surplus availabl·e from expanding employment beyond the 
cooperative equilibrium,where marginal productivity is held above 
the market clearing level of worker remuneration in order to maxi-
mize income per head. Meade(62,64) has proposed a system of 
remuneration on the basis of differentiated individual sharehold-
ing by worker-members, allowing the possibility of discrimination 
against new members by established members, and Sertel(426) has 
ex~ended this approach by suggesting that such shares could be 
saleable on a 'membership market' in much the same •~tay as finar..-
cial shares in a private enterprise may be saleable on a capital 
market. Some potential obstacles to th:s solution have been 
po!nted out by Furubotn(l92), who argues that if membership shares 
sold directly to a new member by a departing member,the new arEl 
member may not be acceptable to the cooperative; whereas if the 
membership share is sold to the cooperative who is then free to 
select a new member of its choice, and who is willing to pay the 
------------------------- ---
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price of membership, there will be an incentive for the coopera-
tive to understate the share-value to the departing member. 
It is clear that the problems which have been identified 
in the preceding literature depend sensitively upon the realism of 
the imputed aims of the labour-managed enterprise. Were the firm 
to be concerned about employment matters per se, a more realistic 
maximand would be a utility index of income and employment 
levels(Law,56;Smith,80); or where , in large labour-managed firms 
management excercised some discretionary power, then growth objec-
tives might enter directly into the firms decision strategy 
(Atkinson,6; Golden,39; Stewart,85 see also Steinherr and 
Peer,82 and Atkinson,7).Horvat(43,44,200), basing his arguments an 
observations of the Yugoslav experience, suggests that worker-
members would be content with acheiving an 'aspiration '"age' and 
maximizing residual profit, although the logical consistency of 
this appraoch has been critisised by McCain(6l).Nevertheless, al-
though these possibilities modify the behaviour of the labour-
managed firm they do not appear to alter significantly the 
underlying set of issues and problems indicated by the simple 
incOme-per-head maximation model (with the exception of Horvat's 
model which behaves identically to that of a private firm). 
'•. 
I i 
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2. Imperfect competition and oligopoly. 
The basic model is easily extended to cover the cases of 
imperfect competition and oligopoly. Meade(l04) shows that under 
these market conditions an equilibrium is reached where average 
income is equated to marginal revenue product. In the case of a 
pure monopolist where positive profits are earnt, the labour 
managed firm will employ less labour and produce less output, for 
reasons similar to those outlined above for the case of a competi-
tive firm earning short-run positive profits. Where entry is 
feasible and market and technological conditions give rise to an 
oligopolistic or imperfectly competitive industrial structure, 
Vanek(428) argues that the smaller size of cooperatives compared 
to capitalist firms would give rise to a more competitive environ-
ment in industries where cooperatives predominate. Where product 
diversification is valued, this may lead to an improvement in 
overall welfare under a cooperative system than a correspondjng 
private ownership system(Neary,l09), even though total output may 
be lower. Further issues relating to market size and structure 
have been covered extensively by Hill and Waterson(95), Neary(l08) 
and Laffont and Moreaux(99,100). 
In the short-run variable membership case an 
•elasticity-preserving• in~rease in demand again indu=es the 
cooperative to dismiss members, but of course all the caveats to 
this proposition raised in the previous section still apply. 
However,if the elasticity of demand were to rise sufficiently as 
demand rose,the increase in marginal revenue product due to this 
r 
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effect may be sufficient in itself to offset the underlying ten- variations. The implications of various regulatory devices for in-
dency to reduce labour input,and employment and output could rise. centives in a model in which effort as well as employment is 
Therefore, although the relative inelasticity of supply would allowed to vary are discussed in Kleindorfer and Sertel(98). In 
still be observed, we have one more example of a case in which the general lump-sum taxes are found to have superior incentive ef-
Ward-type short run 'perverse' effects do not hold. Moreover, as fects to price ceilings which restrict rewards for increased 
in the competitive case,the long run supply response is indeter- effort, and the indexation of incomes are to be prefered to direct 
minate, although it is likely that the supply elasticity would be wage controls for similar reasons. 
lower than that of a profit-maximizing firm (Ireland and Law,420; Further issues in the analysis of imperfectly competi-
Estrin,Jl). tive markets have been discussed in the literature. Price 
An important issue in the consideration of monopoly is discrimination has been the subject of attention in Suckling(ll4), 
that of approprite mechanisms by which such industries may be Clarke and Else(92), Katz and Berrebi(97) and Mai and Jun-Ji(lOJ). 
regulated by a central authority. Meade(64) suggests that where Issues relating to advertising expenditure are discussed in 
there are economies of large scale production and an industry is Ireland and Law (96,420),to duopoly in Vanek(~28) and Law and 
served by a single monopoly, for example the raih1ays, then the Stewart(l02), and to labour market discrimination by Chiplin(9l). 
organization of such a monopoly as a producer cooperative would be Thest are to a certain extent side issues and db not require 
simply innapropriate. However, various schemes for the regulation detailed discussion in this review; however,Chiplin's study of 
of private monopolies, and oligopolies have frequently been labour market discrimination is of particular interest in that it 
proposed as an alternative to outright nationalization, and it is presents a rationale for the special promotion of cooperative en-
not surprising that a variety of schemes for the regulation of terprises among particular marginalized sectors of the la~our 
labour managed firms ha•1e been devised, ranging from combinations force who may otherwise be disadvantaged by the exercise of un-
of price ceilings and lump-sum taxes(Vanek,Pienkos an~ favourable preferences of private employers. 
Steinherr,ll6) dna of excise and lump-sum taxes (Guesnerie and\ 
Laffont ,94), to the indexation of workers' earnings to total 
revenue(Landsberger and Subotnik,lOl). Ireland and Law(420) 
propose that their Enterprise Incentive Scheme could be linked to 
a system of lump-sum taxation to eliminate monopoly profits, 
whilst at the same time ensuring efficient adjustment to demand 
I 
i 
I I 
I/ 
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3. Risk and uncertainty 
It has long been recognized that in the real world 
economic agents have less than perfect information concerning the 
environment within which their economic decisions are made. For 
example the actual prices at which output produced today may be 
sold tommorrow may be somewhat uncertain, the availability,or 
price, of supplies of key inputs may not be fully assured. In 
other words, risk and uncertainty are pervasive features of modern 
industrial market economies where production and consumption deci-
sions are only coordinated ex post through the invisible hand of 
the market,and this goes beyond the uncertainty caused in tradi-
tional agricultural economies by,for example,unpredicatable 
weather conditions. 
The effects of simple price uncertainty upon the perfor-
mance of labour managed firms has been analysed independently by 
several authors. The case of a firm producing in a competitive 
market with single variable input has been examined by Taub(l45), 
Muzondo( 139), Pestieau(l42), Ha·Hawini and Michel(l25,127), 
Ramachandran,Russell and Seo(l43), and Paroush and Kahana(l~l). 
The principle finding is that risk averse labour managed firms 
produce more, and employ more labour, than risk neutral labour-\ 
managed firms, and may even produce more than risk averse 
conventional firms. The basic reason for this result is that un-
der uncertainty, the equilibrium balance between the desire to 
reduce employment so as to spread revenues over a smaller 
workforce and the desire to increase employment so as to spread 
-17-
fixed costs over a larger workforce, is affected unevenly. The im-
pact of uncertainty is to reduce the wieght of the former 
consideration since under risk aversion the expected utility of an 
uncertain net revenue is less than the expected utility of a 
certainty-equivalent net revenue. In other words, due to risk 
aversion the utility value of a given increase in revenue away 
from the mean is not balanced by the utility value of an identical 
decrease of revenue above the mean.However the backward bending 
supply curve (specified in terms of expected price) is still a 
feature of the labour managed firms reaction to changes in 
(expected) output price. These, and associated results have been 
the subject of extensive commentaries of a critical and 
clarificatory nature. Bonin(ll7) disvutes an associated conclusion 
of Muzondo's paper that under decreasing absolute risk aversion 
the supply response is ambiguous, and is able to show that even in 
this case, the backward bending supply curve of the certainty case 
is replicated, a correction which is accepted by ~luzondo(l40). 
Hawawini(l23), (cementing on the paper of Paroush and Kahana), 
Hawawini and Michel(l26), and Horowitz(l33) (commenting on 
Muzondo's paper), extend the results to the case of more than one 
variable input. They show that although the labour managed firm 
employs more workers under price uncertainty than under price cer-
tainty,since non-labour inputs may be substituted for labour 
inputs their use may fall sufficiently under uncertainty so as to 
render the net impact on output levels indeterminate. ?urther, 
Hawawini and Michel(l26) show that the basic results are substan-
tially unchanched in the case of an imperfectly competitive mar~et 
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environment.Even in the case of price instability,where production societies are glossed over; for example,the possibility of self-
decisions are taken after price~ become known, as opposed to the insurance and the relationship between outside financial 
case of uncertainty where production decisions are taken ~ ante, institutions and the firm,are not addressed. These issues are 
the main results still hold in the case of risk aversion taken up in a more sophisticated analysis developed independently 
(Hawawini,l24).Finally,the case of uncertainty in future prices by Bonin(ll8,119), McCain(l35), Miyazaki and Neary(l38) and 
(futures markets) has been tackled by Hey(l32) and Taub(l46). Wolfstetter,Brown and Meran(l48). Miyazaki and Neary characterize 
Hey (131) reproduces the more important results of this the labour-managed firm as a contract-based production coalition 
debate results using an alternative methodological framework based of workers, and distinguish between a short run in which the 
upon the 'duality' approach, which simplifies the mathematical firm's membership is fixed by contract - but in which short run 
manipulations involved and yields direct comparisons between the layoffs are permitted in response to price fluctuations - and a 
cases of labour managed and conventional firms. Hey and Suckling long run in which membership itself is variable. In the absence of 
(128,129,130) attempt to illustrate this claim through directly compensation payments to laid off '"orkers, they sho•o~ that the 
re•.,orking the paper of Hawawini and Michel(l25),Muzondo(l39) and short run supply curve of the firm is positively sloped, so long 
Ramachandran et. al.(l43).In their replies Ramachandran et. as income per head is above the reservation wage,i.e.that income 
al.(l4~), and Hawawini and Michel(l26) vigorously dispute the more level which could be earnt in alternative activities. However, 
general applicability of the Hey and Suckling approach.However, should compensation payments be allowed (self-insurance) then eE-
Wang and Bowles(l47) find Hey and Suckling's approach useful in ficient risk-sharing is possible, and the short-run supply curve 
proving that the labour managed firm will decrease output when is positively sloped throughout its range. In this way it is shown 
price uncertainty decreases. (A similar version of this proposi- that the labour managed firm could indeed make efficient use of 
tion is available in the literature described above, but is only its labour resources. Wolfstetter et. al.(l48) and Miyazaki and 
demonstrated for the more restrictive case of decreasing absolut~ Neary (137) consider the case in which both hours and short run 
risk aversion.) \. employment are 'lar iable and find that although essentially the 
Whilst the case of simple price uncertainty which is same results apply, the level of optimal compensation depends upon 
dealt with in the above models is of some interest, the context of the exact form of the workers' utility function assumed; in par-
the analysis could just as well be that of a traditional agricul- ticular whether leisure is a normal, neutral or inferior good. It 
tural economy. Many of the distinguishing aspects of the problem should be noted that the insurance aspects of such arrangements 
of risk and uncertainty as they impinge upon complex industrial implies that '"orkers incomes would be invariant to layoffs, •,d th 
.tj· 
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all workers paying internal insurance contributions; this is why 
compensation is feasible in this case, whilst it was not in the 
Steinherr-Thisse scheme discussed in section l. Moreover in the 
context of uncertainty, prices are supposed to move in both an up-
wards and a downwards direction, and so the issue of once-for-all 
variations in price reflecting an underlying shift in preferences 
or technology, '"hich '"as the focus of the earlier discussion, is 
not addressed here. Finally Wolstetter et. al. consider the long 
run case when membership is variable given efficient risk-sharing 
contracts for any membership size. They show that the variable-
membership supply curve would be upward sloping and hance 
efficiency ensured only in the case where new members could be 
discriminated against by the rquirement that they pay a membership 
fee,as in Meade's 'inegalitarian cooperative' (Meade,62). 
Although income uncertainty for each price realization 
(within states of nature) would be eliminated by such means, 
workers would remain exposed to income fluctuations as prices 
varied from period to period (across states of nature). This 
problem could be overcome if firms were financed externally by 
risk-neutral creditors and debts were repaid in a state-contingent 
fashion,i.e. repayments being high(low) when prices are rel~-
tively high( low) .This may only be possible, however, where ~ 
central bank in a socialist economy, or a specialized bank dealing 
directly with the cooperative sector in a mixed economy acts as a 
risk-neutral creditor. Ordinary commercial banks may be un•,.,illing 
to extend loans to labour managed firms, where by definition they 
have no control over, or voice in, production decisions,ar.d due to 
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assyrnetric information cannot easily monitor the firm's true per-
forrnance (Buck and Chiplin, 120; Schlicht and Von Weizsaecker,207; 
Gui,l99). An alternative possibility would be for the firm to 
issue non-voting 'risk-participation' shares (McCain,203; Sertel 
and Steinherr,lll; Wolfstetter et al,l48); however the feasibility 
of this suggestion rests upon the existence of a perfectly corn-
petitive capital market and a lack of assyrnetric information 
concerning the actual performance of the firm. To deal with this 
problem investors would need to be given some say in the running 
of the firm and optimal risk-shifting would then require the in-
stitutional form of a participatory nature rather than a pure 
cooperative. Such forms have been referred to as a hybrid labour 
managed/capitalist firm (Meran and Wolfstetter,l36), a par-
ticipatory 'internal bargaining' firm (Miyazaki and Neary,l37) or 
a 'capital-labour partnership' (Meade, 64). 
I 
I 
i 
! 
I I I 
t:l_L 
-22-
4. Incentive structures 
As we have seen a fundamental criticism of the basic 
model of the labour managed firm has been that workers would be 
reluctant to dismiss their colleagues for the sake of a marginal 
gain in income that could be attained following a price increase. 
Apart from the issue of solidarity among members of the work corn-
munity, the problem is also due to the self interest of the 
workers when there is an equal chance that any '"orker who votes 
for dismissals may find him or herself among those to be dismiss-
ed. Then adjustments to demand fluc~ations are then taken in the 
form of income rather than employment variations. 
It is clear however, that changing the number of 
employed workers is not the only means available to a firm to al-
ter the amount of work done, since it is always open to the firm 
to institute a system of incentives which would influence the num-
ber of hours performed, or the effort supplied, by each worker. 
This possibility was first formally analysed by Sen(l75) who dis-
tinguished between two basic forms of remuneration systems by 
'"hich revenues could be shared among the firm's members: 
'distribution according to needs' where the resulting net rev~nue 
is shared equally among the members of the firm; and 'distributfon 
according to work', where net revenue is shared according to hours 
of labour actually contributed by each member (the latter only 
being appropriate where effort, or hours of work, are observable). 
Such remuneration systems differ in the optimal responses which 
they induce from individual members of the firm, in other words 
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they provide different incentives to work. Under the 'Cournot' as-
sumption that each worker imagines that a change in his own supply 
of effort or hours of work will not induce a change in anyone 
else's,Sen is able to demonstrate that ~ithin a system of dis-
tribution according to needs, there will be an undersupply of 
effort; each worker will be tempted to 'free ride' on the labour 
of others when personal incomes are related to the total labour 
income of the group of members rather than to individual effort. 
on the other hand, distribution according to labour input induces 
an oversupply of effort, since each member will try to lay a claim 
to as large as possible a share of total net revenue by increasing 
his recorded labour input beyond the point at which the marginal 
disutility of effort is equated to the marginal product of labour. 
one solution to this paradox is the use of mixed payment systems 
composed of appropriate mixes of straight share distributions and 
payments related to hours contributed,in such a way that an effi-
cient level of effort supply is attained from the group, 
efficiency being defined as a position in which the ·;alue of 
labour marginal productivity in terms of hours worked is equated 
to the individual's marginal rate of substitution between income 
and leisure. Sen also shows that when utilities are interdependent 
so that there is perfect altruism within the grou? then,again,an 
efficient outcome can be attained. Bennnett(l49) and Browning(l55) 
explore some difficulties with Sen's approach when the model is 
generalized to consider the case where the members of the firm do 
not all have identical preferences;and Bental and Ben-Zion(l50) 
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discuss the ·case where preferences differ between managers and 
'"Orkers. 
An alternative approach has been to abandon the Cournot 
assumption and allow for mechanisms through which the effort sup-
ply decisions of the workers become linked, so that each worker 
imagines that any adjustment he or she makes in effort supplied or 
hours worked will be matched by similar responses of all other 
workers in the firm. Under these circumstances it is easy to show 
that either remuneration system leads to efficiency in levels of 
individual labour supply,as is shown by Putterman(l72),on whose 
important survey '"e have drawn for many of the points raised in 
this section. Bradley(l53), Bonin(l52), and Menconi(l69) argue 
that whene•1er all workers have identical preferences,then they 
would surely imagine that any stimulus which caused them to in-
crease their own labour input would likewise act upon the 
decisions of all other group members, whilst Cameron(l56) takes an 
intermediate position, arguing that such an effect will be only 
partial.However,the sources of such a speculation are, as 
Putterman notes,left unclear. Other authors have su.ggested 
mechanisms whereby simultaneous linkages in effort supply may he 
induced. Berman(lSl) points to the possibilities for direct co'{r-
dination which exists in the parti=ip~tory environment of a labo~r 
managed cooperative, an argument reflected also in Sertel(426) and 
Vanek(428). Markusen(284,167) makes a similar argument in terms of 
bargaining mechanisms, whilst Chinn(l57) relies upon the effect of 
ideological commitment as a mechanism which would promote group 
solidarity. A summary and integration of these various strands of 
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thought, including an analysis of supply response under different 
remuneration schemes, is provided by Ireland and Law(l6~). They 
demonstate that although the various re'lenue sharing schemes 
f . · t 1·ncent 1"ve to efficient labour suppl7 under provide a suf 1c1en 
non-Cournot assumptions, the short run supply response depends 
sensitively on the structure of woorkers preferences, although it 
is unambiguously positive when income effects are absent. 
Perhaps the most consistent proposal,however, which does 
not depend upon ad hoc assumptions on the degree of group 
solidarity is due to Israelson(l66) and Putterman(l71) who develop 
a model of 'rational conjectures'. Whenever one worker changes his 
effort supply or hours of work, that affects the ove~all net 
revenue available for distribution. This ~ill naturally lead to a 
reassessment by all other members of the group of their own effort 
input, and there will thus be a sort of multiplier effect with 
successive rounds of adjustment taking place. Whilst the final 
outcome of such a process is unclear, calculations by Putterman 
and DiGiorgio(l73) show a convergence to equilibrium under a 
variety of specifications of the model. 
A further development has been in the use of the 
'repeated game' approach, in which the protracted repetition of 
the same situation over time allows workar~ to learn about the 
responses of other workers to their own effort supply decisions. 
An efficient outcome to such a process ~ight be supported by 
'strategic precommittment'(Putterman,l72) so that each ·,orker 
agrees to match any adjustment by other workers.When the repeated 
game is supported by some form of penalty for shirking Radner(l7~) 
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shows that the equilibrium levels of effort supply will only be effort supply decisions of the non-Cournot type reviewed above,or 
efficient in the unlikely case that there is no discounting of fu- the mixed payments systems suggested by Sen. In these cases it has 
ture utilities.With discounting, either continuous monitoring of been established that when workers preferences are alike, the 
team performance or some similar mechanism which maintained team various revenue-sharing schemes, whether based upon equal sharing 
cohesiveness and group morale would be required to maintain the or on work points may provide sufficient incentives to an effi-
cooperative equilibrium in effort supply(McLeod,l68). However, the cient supply of effort from cooperative members. 
advantage of these formulations of the repeated game approach over 
the bargaining or coordination mechanisms described above is not 
great, as they are essentially formalizations of those earlier 
ideas. 
Holmstrom(l62) argues that a general implication of 
these models is that whenever linkages between effort supply deci-
sions are of the Cournot type and incomes are formed on tne basis 
of revenue sharing, efficiency in effort supply can only be estab-
lished when the budget constraint of the group is broken, and an 
outside agent,for example an owner of a private firm, or the state 
in the case of nationalized industries or the Soviet type sys-
tem,clai~s any residual profit or loss .In critisism of this 
vie•", Haller ( 161) argues that social welfare may nevertheless be 
increased under a cooperative system since the outside agent 
provides no labour contribution at all, and an enlarged partrter-
ship would provide a greater level of output, a.lbJ.i t 
inefficiently, than that (efficiently) available from the initial 
group plus an owner. Moreover, the applicability of Holmstrom's 
argument rests entirely upon the assumption of Cournot reactions 
and a system of distribution according to 'needs', i.e. pure 
revenue sharing; it ignores the various possibilities of linked 
I 
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5, Investment ·and finance. problems of efficient risk-shifting and appropriate financial in-
stitutions to support investment in labour managed firms, whether 
The discussion of the previous sections took place on they be pure cooperatives or hybrid organizations of the type in-
'' the explicit assumption that the capital stock was fixed in the dicated in section 3. 
short run; or that where long run considerations were taken into The framework set out by the Texas school, has been con-
account and adjustments to the firm's capital stock was con- ducted on the assumption of a fixed labour force,(Furubotn and 
sidered, it was on the implicit assumption that costless and Pejovich,l94,l95,196;Furubotn,l86,187,l90; Pejovich,205,206), or a 
instantaneous adjustment to the long run equilibrium capital stock fixed decision making group with an upper limit to the labour 
was feasible. However,in practice adjustments from one equilibrium force (Furubotn,l88 see also Berman and Berman,l79; 
level of the capital stock to another following parameter change rurubotn,l89). This,not on the basis of any of the considerations 
(say in prices or the level of demand) takes time and requires a which were indicated in section l, but purely as a convenient ad 
process of net investment. The analysis of the determinants of in- hoc assumption, presumably to focus attention on the problems of 
vestment and the time path of adjustment to new equilibria is capital stock adjustment. However this procedure changes the na-
i therefore a subject of attention in its own right, and requires tu re of the problem entirely,away from the income-per-head 
I I 
I I tools of dynamic economic theory in contrast to the 'comparative maximization paradigm (whose peculiarities result largely from the 
I 
statics' approach which is only appropriate to the comparison of fact that it is a ratio maximand) to a value-added maximization 
equilibria and assumes away adjustment costs and adjustment times paradigm, the properties of which differ qualitatively from those 
-a point emphasised by Horvat(200). of the basic model. Hawing performed this slieght of hand,various 
Two distinct approaches to this problem have been iden- real world features of cooperative and labour managed institutions 
tified, schools of thought to which Stephen(427) refers to as the are then reintroduced in a somewhat bewildering array of combina-
school associated with the work of Furubotn ~nd tions, in an effort to demonstrate that labour-managed enterprises 
Pejovich,and \ the "Cornell" school associated principally with the will undertake less investment than comparable privately owned 
work of Vanek.An extensive and not entirely fruitful debate has firms. Thus,it is alleged that labour-managed firms undertake in-
been conducted within the framework of these two approaches,which vestment decisions on the basis of a relatively short planning 
has not been assisted by the tendency of the protagonists to horizon; that the collective ownership of assets,by precluding the 
obscure some of the fundamental issues, which relate to the private recovery of the principal of an investment,deters en-
terprise self-financing; that a requirement to maintain the book 
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value of assets once installed deters both internal enterprise 
finance and recourse to outside sources of funds where they are 
available. Certainly all of these problems, were they to actually 
be of relevance to any existing labour-managed firm would no doubt 
reduce investment levels below the level which would be achieved 
in their absence, and quite naturally so, since they are all 
mechanisms which impose constraints upon the investment decision. 
However,it is also equally clear that they are not problems in-
trinsic to labour-managed firms as such and would be equally 
re,strictive in any institutional context. To take each issue in 
turn,~e first observe that the length of the planning horizon is 
essentially an empirical issue and is not easily determined from 
theoretical considerations alone. Whilst the planning horizon may 
be limited to the expected length of tenure of the average worker-
member. This could well be, on average, say twenty years, 
especially considering the high probability that turnover will be 
lower in the representative labour-managed firm precisely due to 
the financial and firm-specific human capital investments which 
are ~ade in such a firm by the average worker. Typical lengths of 
planning horizons for investment decisions based on the payback-
period criteria in large privately owned corporations are~ by 
coni..rast much lower, say around 
~ 
five years on average 
(Uvalic,213). Secondly, the collective ownership of assets may 
well act to discourage internal financing of investment, but it 
would not discourage the demand for external finance where this is 
available;and since the Texas shoal allows for a mix of internal 
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and external finance, this should present no obstacle to invest-
ment as such, but only alter its structure. Moreover, existing 
cooperatives in western Europe are entitled to raise internal 
finance on the basis of loans from the worker-members, which are 
returnable on quiting the enterprise; a feature of the Basque 
cooperatives at Mondragon, among other examples,which is em-
phasised by Gui(l98) and Ellerman(l85). Thus, that part of the 
debate which has been focussed on the issue of the absence of 
private property rights in enterprise assets,and the corresponding 
disincentive to self-finance investment, has effectively side-
stepped the critical issue of the overall level of investment, 
whether from internal or external sources. Finally,the issue of 
capital maintenance requirements is relevant only in the context 
of a socialist labour-managed economy such as that of Yugoslavia. 
Since there,enterprise capital is considered to be •social 
property', the individual firms are forbidden to profit from its 
•consumption' through non-replacement of the financial value of 
the enterprise assets. However, even in that case, if this regula-
tion is interpreted as applying to the historic value of assets, 
high inflation effectively limits its disincentive impact on in-
vestment levels. 
The Cornell school on the other hand, starting directly 
from the premises of the basic model of section l above, does take 
into account the optimal level of employment ""hich ""ould accompany 
any programme of capital accumulation. Ho•,ever, the analysis is 
still conducted mainly on the basis of the comparative statics 
methodology, and so , again, sidesteps some of the crucial is5ues 
r~s 1 'f' 
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of the inves~ment decision, in particular the characterization of presents an analysis of an externally financed firm using the 
the path taken by the firm between equilibria. The essence of the technique of dynamic programming.On the assumption of costly ad-
Cornell school approach is to make comparisons between the long- justment of both membership and capital,he finds that the 
': 
run equilibrium which would be attained under exclusively internal sensitivity of optimal policies to parameter shifts depends upon 
financing, and that which would be attained under exclusively ex- the direction of adjustment,i.e. whether the firm is expanding or 
ternal financing. The analysis is conducted consistently on the contracting. Litt,Steinherr and Thisse(202) and Bartlett(l78) 
basis of the income-per-head maximization assumption, and although employ the technique of optimal control to analyse a self-financed 
a number of the 'real world' frictions so important to the Texas labour-managed firm's investment decisions. They derive optimal 
school are taken into consideration, the Cornell school is able to paths of capital accumulation and confirm Vanek's 
derive its results even in the absence of such considerations, 'underinvestment' conjecture. However, an integration of the in-
(indeed, the comparative static method implicitly assumes an in- ternal and external financing cases in a dynamic framework has 
finite horizon, since by its nature it involves a compatison of still to be acheived. 
long run stationary equilibria achieved after all intermediate ad-
justment phases have worked themselves out). ~ot surprisingly,the 
main conclusion of this school of thought is that capital stock 
and output will be lower under a regime of self-financing than un-
der the alternative regime of external financing. This 
'underinvestment effect' derives from the fact that a self 
financed investment requires an act of immediate restriction of 
current consumption, whereas an externally financed investment can 
be paid off in a series of instalments over time. In other wo~ds, 
\ 
the imposition of self-flnancing alone, imposes a restriction or 
constraint on the investment decision by denying the enterprise 
access to a broadly based capital market. 
Whilst a fully developed dynamic model of the investment 
problem for a labour-managed firm has not yet been fully worked 
out , some steps in this direction have been attempted. Bonin(l80) 
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6. Employee oarticipation and codetermined firms 
Traditional theories of the firm of the standard type 
found in microeconomic textbooks rely upon a relatively unsophis-
ticated treatment of the employment relationship, in which workers 
passively supply just the amount of labour input demanded by the 
firm at a given market determined wage rate. Even where labour 
unions are able to raise the wage rate above its competitive level 
th• employers ability to choose the optimal level of labour input 
is usually treated as unproblematic. Recent criticisms of this 
theory (eg.Aoki,252,432),have recognized that the relative per-
manence of a firm-specific 'labour-pool' may give rise to intra-
firm bargaining over the division of the 'organizational rent' 
which derives from the existence of indivisible,firm-specific 
human and capital inputs.In such a situation there is room for 
worker participation in the decisions which govern the production 
and distribution of the economic surplus. In this section there-
fore, we survey the literature on employee participation in the 
context of 'codetermined' firms, an analysis which has a bearing 
on aspects of the hypothetical 'capital-labour partnerships' men-
tioned at the end of section 3. 
The theoretical work on the performance of 'labour-
managed' firms which was described in section !,indicates that 
where workers participate in decisions on levels of factor 
utilization then both employment and capital may be reduced below 
the level which a similarly placed pure profit maximizing 
(entrepreneurial) firm would choose. At the same time the work of 
-35-
industrial sociologists has shown that there is scope for dispute 
over levels of work performance and methods of work organization 
at the shop floor. By focusing on these two levels of decision 
making it is possible to give economic content to the distinction 
often made between 'higher level participation' which refers to 
decisions that relate to the running of the whole enterprise,such 
as those on investment and output and 'lower level participation' 
which refers to those management decisions relating to the control 
of day-to-day shop floor activity. In West Germany for example 
participation at these two levels is formalized through codeter-
mination legislation. 1'At the business enterprise 
level,codetermination is secured institutionally through the right 
of workers to send representatives of their interests to the 
Committees of Decision (Entscheidungsgremien):at plant 
level,however, there is a works council with an independent or-
ganization for representation of the workers"(Roberts,550,p37). 
The works council for example enables worker participation "in 
matters which can affect the technically organized design of the 
job,work flow,and the working environment;the right to codetermine 
short-time working and overtime;and the possibility of estab-
lishing a codetermined social plan for the enterprise'' 
(Ibid,p4l).In the United Kingdom lower level participation has 
been more informal, and Poole(549) has pointed out the extension 
of participation through the shop steward system which accompanied 
the productivity agreements of the 1960's and 1970's. 
Much of the recent literature on codetermined or par-
ticipatory firms has focused upon essentially distributional 
u=lj,,l'"l" 
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issues. In Svejnar's (87) participatory firm, for ex-
ample,shareholders,managers and ~orkers codetermine the firm's 
overall objectives. A 'variable power' bargaining model is used 
which formalizes the practice of codetermination as a solution to 
a bargaining game. The firm then acts so as to maximize a multi-
plicative function of shareholder's utility,managers utility and 
workers' utility. In 'model I' the utilities are specified as the 
simple unit prices of the relevant factor input, net of reserva-
tion price. The utilities are defined exactly over the equilibrium 
sets of factor inputs, so that only the interests of those agents 
actually employed within the firm are taken into account;the sys-
tern of participation is company-specific. This is held to be 
relevant to the German system of Mitbestimmung where "employee 
representatives to the board of directors and works council repre-
sent the interest of employees in the given 
enterprise"(Svejnar,p316). The solution to the maximization 
problem indicates that factors are employed up to the point at 
which their marginal productivity is equal to the sum of the 
reservation wage and a share in the enterprise profits determined 
by the participants' relative bargaining power. This is an ineffi-
cient equilibrium however since factor input use is restricted 
\ 
relative to the benchmark case of perfectly competitive profit-
maximizing private firm,(where marginal productivity is pushed 
down to the market price of a factor),unless a mechanism exists 
such as unrestricted entry and exit of firms into an industry to 
ensure zero (economic) profits. In this sense the short run be-
haviour of the codetermined firm is similar to that of the 
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labour-managed firm which we characterized in section l.In addi-
tion, as has been emphasised by Furubotn(256), where workers' 
earnings include a share in enterprise profits the reinvestib~e 
surplus will be lower and hence growth and future employment may 
be adversely affected. In an extension of the model,Ireland and 
Law(259) show that a codetermined firm of this type would react to 
price fluctuations through adjustments of factor prices rather 
than levels of factor employment.They regard this as a favourable 
outcome since the codetermined firm can then be viewed as a type 
of 'work community' where "the preference for factor price adjust-
ments over quantity adjustments fosters solidarity and the 
identification of the worker ~ith his or her enterprise". 
Allocative and distributional efficiency then relies heavily on 
open entry and exit of firms into and from production sectors, a 
process which Ireland and Law see as being achievable through a 
confederation structure of codetermined firms,and they point to 
the Mondragon cooperatives as a possible example. Certainly one 
may imagine that many of the social costs of disruptive labour 
mobility which have been attendant features of the capitalist 
market system throughout its development,and ~hich have been elo-
quently described by Seabrook(551), may be mitigated through such 
a system, but the associated problems of planning and coordination 
~..thich •Hould be involved to ensure macro-economic efficie:1cy are 
still open questions. 
An alternative formulation, Svejnar's 'model !I', rccog-
nizes that it would often be unrealistic to limit the interests 
which are represented in the codetermination process only to those 
I $!5*1"1''"'' 
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currently employed or associated with the firm. The wider con- yielded results consistent with either interpretation, and failed 
stituency of union members both within and outside the firm for to refute either model (Svejnar,412). 
I example might be regarded as interested parties in the codeter-
Svejnar's model II however, although more favourable to 
':! mination process, although it is difficult to imagine a similar the case for codetermination could equally well,as he himself 
story being told for shareholders and managers in the context of a notes, be considered as a model of collective bargaining between a 
private ownership economy. The case of a nationalized industry or union and a profit maximizing firm. McDonald and Solow(263) have 
of a decentralized planned economy with codetermination and presented a model of union-firm collective bargaining in just this 
genuine trade union representation might be of relevance. In model spirit Traditional collective bargaining models have been based 
II therefore the utilities which are the subject of model I are upon a scheme in which the union is free to determine the 'wage and 
augmented by an amount x/~ where x is the firm's equilibrium the firm reacts by selecting a level of employment to maximize 
employment level of a factor,and ~ the membership of the broader profits, which yields a wage-employment solution 'on the demand 
constituency. In this case the solution to the maximization curve'. MacDonald and Solow show, however,that when the union 's 
problem gives equality between the factor marginal product and its utility function includes both wages and employment as argu-
reservation price, and codetermination is allocatively efficient. ments,then both parties can be better off by selecting a wage-
Actual remuneration still embodies elements of profit sharing ac- employment solution 'off the demand curve' .This contrasts with 
carding to relative bargaining power (as total revenue is fully Svejnar's efficient factor pricing result, mainly because of the 
distributed) so long as economic profits are positive, but this more realistic assumption that it is in practice only Labour which 
fact no longer plays an important role in resource allocation. Of has a 'wider copstituency' to represent. Miyazaki(264) has rescued 
course it is important to be able to distinguish empirically be- the efficiency properties of 'internal bargaining' however, by 
tween the two models so as to determine "whether the union's considering a case in which labour and management codetermine the 
influence over these representative bodies is sufficienu to levels of employment and wage rates, in an environment of uncer-
propagate the broader perspective of model 
\ 
·rr•• tainty, and in which efficient risk-sharing is achieved by means 
(Svejnar,87,p324),especially since in the German case there are of compensation payments to (temporarily) laid of~ workers.An ex-
"important institutional features which might make model II more ample is the institut:on of the Cassa Integrazione in Italy which 
applicable' (p316). However,empirical analysis of a number of pays up to a certain percentage of the full wage to temporarily 
German industries with and without codetermination institutions laid off workers, although this is essenentially an external 
rather than an internal insurance scheme. The interesting feature 
IP.,T!i'"' 
' ' 
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of this result is that marginal product factor pricing is achieved commission of 1966 and '"ere actively promoted in the Bullock 
under maximization of simple (expected) individual worker utility, Committee report of 1977. However the only important examples were 
I I 
on the side of labour,and (expected) profits on the side of capi-
tal,rather in the fashion of Svejnar's 'model I'. Models of this 
experiments in the nationalised Steel Corporation .which appointed 
worker directors to divisional boards in 1969 and on to the main 
type generally rely upon the idea of a fixed 'labour pool' from board in 1978, whilst worker directors were also introduced on to 
which temporary layoffs and rehires are achieved as market demand the board of the Post Office in 1978. As Brannen(434) remarks, 
fluctuates. Miyazaki(264) is able to make an extension into the "The paradox of boardroom participation is that if worker repre-
longer run analysis of the determination of optimal labour pool sentatives are strong enough and willing to put forward competing 
size and capital stock, and in this case he shows that the rationalities they are likely to create conflict in the boardroom, 
stronger is labour's internal bargaining position the higher will and ensure that real centres of decision making move elsewhere, 
be equilibrium wages and the lower long run capital-labour ratios thus rendering themselves impotent in the director role; but if 
and growth. Thus although codetermination achieves efficient al- they adopt the director role then their own raison d'etre, from 
location and distribution given appropriate risk-sharing the perspective of the workforce disappears"(pll4) 
mechanisms, Furubotn's criticism that growth will be lower under Whilst the impact of higher level participation has 
such a system still stands. received considerable attention,that of lower level participation 
Despite this wealth of theorizing on the operation of has been less extensi•1ely covered,with the notable exception of 
codetermination at the broad policy levels of factor remuneration McCain(261), who argues that the effort-productivity relation is 
and factor employment there remain few examples of such a system suboptimal in the absence of employee participation due to the in-
in practice. In Germany, where the system is most developed, complete nature of the employment contract. Employee participation 
parity representation is limited to few industries, and then at at plant level could enable improvements in work organization 
the level of financial control (the Aufsichtsrat) rather i;han in which would result in efficiency gains, the benefits of which 
~ (the Vorstand). As McCain( 261') ob-the highest execut1v~ level could be distributed bet•,een emplyer and employee through plant 
serves "if German Mitbestimmung constitutes a joint management, it level bargaining. Simon( 267) develops a similar model '"hi eh 
does so despite and to some extent contrary to the intent of the provides a framework in '"hich the economic logic of lower le•1el 
law"(p68). Codetermination proposals in the United Kingdom in the participation can be understood. Focussing on the conditions of 
form of worker-directors on the company board have been the sub- the employment contract,Simon observes that:"employees ... enter 
ject of discussion at least since the time of the Donovan into the system in two sharply distinct roles. Initially they are 
I I 
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owners of a factor of production (their own labour) which they 
sell for a definite price. Having done so they they become corn-
pletely passive factors of production employed by the entrepreneur 
in such a way as to maximize his profit"(p293). In Simon's employ-
ment contract the employer reserves the right to select the tasks 
which the worker will perform. This will be advantageous to the 
employer when there is uncertainty as to the exact tasks or se-
quence of tasks which the worker should perform over the time 
period of the contract. It will also be advantageous to the worker 
in these circumstances to submit to the authority of the employer 
if he/she is not too concerned about which tasks he performs. 
(e.g. as in the case of less skilled labour).However; contrary to 
Simon's view of the matter,workers may be able to develop 
strategies of resistance to the exercise of employer authority,and 
may strategically vary the amount of effort which he provides. If 
the worker trusts that the employer will take into account his 
disutility in selecting tasks, then he would be prepared to sign a 
contract for a particular wage/effort incentive package. On the 
other hand once the employment contract has been signed the 
employer may have little incentive to take into account the 
worker's disutility of effort in his choice of task assignments. 
Thus there is an inbuilt element of social confLict in the em~loy-
ment relationship, with the employer attempting to extend his area 
of authority, and the employee attempting to reduce the amount of 
effort supplied. On the other hand if an atmosphere of trust can 
be established, a joint maximization of worker's and employers' 
utilities may give rise to a Pareto optimal provision of effort 
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and exercise of authority.Thus participation may be an important 
institutional device in establishing an atmosphere in which 
cooperative solutions to the "effort game" are feasible, a pos-
sibility suggested by Cable(255). 
"'M.I"'W. I !'!"' .['I •
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7. ?rofit sha~ing 
One distinguishing feature of producer cooperatives and 
participatory firms is, as we have seen, that in contrast to the 
system of remuneration by a flat wage payment, incomes are formed 
through various types of sharing formulae. In the case of coopera-
tives and labour managed firms generally, value added is shared 
either on a per capita basis, or in relation to effort or hours 
contributed, or in Meade's inegalitarian cooperative on the basis 
of the number of shares held by each worker-member. In the par-
ticipatory firm 'organizational rent' is shared on a basis 
determined by 'internal bargaining'. More recently a debate has 
emerged concerning the possible economic effects of share systems 
within non-participatory private-ownership firms. In such a system 
workers are paid a basic wage plus a share of enterprise profits, 
the profit sharing rate· being contractually specified by the 
e!llployer. Weitzman(293,294,295,296.~36) and Vanek(292), (see also 
Atkinson,27l),argue that there will be two important economic ef-
facts of this procedure. First:y, since the marginal cost of 
labour to the employer is the basic '"age, '"here labour incomes are 
the same in both a profit sharing and a conventional wage sy~tem, 
marginal labour costs will be lower in the share system, an~ so 
each individual firm will wish to employ more labour under the 
share system than under the wage system. Secondly, at full employ-
ment, in the share system each firm will be constrained to employ 
less labour than its profit maximizing objective leads it to 
demand. Since the full employment labour earnings are the same in 
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both systems, each firm in the share system would like to employ 
more labour since basic wages are belo•" the •1alue of labour r.tar-
ginal product (Weitzman,293). Following any 'not too large' 
downward shock to the system (a fall in the marginal productivity 
schedule), so long as the full employment value of labour marginal 
productivity remains above the basic wage, share firms will still 
be operating with excess demand for labour and full employment 
will be maintained. In contrast, under the wage system, any shock 
which leads to a fall in the value of labour marginal productivity 
leads to an immediate reduction in the demand for labour. In this 
r11ay, it is claimed,once full employment has been attained under 
the share system, it will be maintained over the course of the 
business cycle: the system is insulated from external shocks and 
destabilizing contractionary multiplier effects. 
Nuti(287,288) has raised doubts however as to the ease 
with which full employment may be reached within such a system. In 
a situation of prolonged slump and high unemployment the existing 
capital stock may be insufficient to employ all those who are 
seeking '"ork even though the demand for labour of each individual 
firm may be increased, and in addition the Keynesian problem of 
insufficient aggregate demand may prevent the attainment of full 
employm~nt. Should full employment be reached,moreover, the system 
may be institutionally unstable. Firstly employers experiencing 
excess demand for labour would be tempted to revise basic rates 
upwards, and the share system may revert to a wage system. 
Secondly, ~n conditions of aggregate excess d~mand for labour, it 
would be difficult to prevent workers from gaining influence over 
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the decision making process. Nuti argues that in this case the it should be noted that a labour managed producer cooperative 
employment restrictive tendencies associated with labour-managed economy also enjoys some immunity from contractionary shocks at 
and participatory firms would reduce the employment expansive im- full employment. As we have seen in section 1, a fall in the value 
pact of the share system, although as we shall shortly see, this of labour marginal productivity opens up a gap between labours' 
may not be a serious problem for a labour managed cooperative marginal product and its cost expressed in terms of income-~er-
economy operating in a regime of full employment.Outside of full head. For a downward shock, average incomes fall faster than 
employment however,this point underlines the importance of the marginal product, at the given (here full employment) labour 
non-participatory nature of the share economy as proposed by force. consequently the marginal '"orker becomes more valuable to 
Weitzman. As Brittan(274) notes:"if (profit sharing) is to work on the cooperative >~hich '"ould then like to employ more labour,and so 
the Weitzman model, management must retain and even strengthen its full employment is maintained, just as in the private ownership 
right to hire and fire. This gives the whole idea a more astrin- share economy. As far as upward shocks are concerned, by the argu-
gent flavour and separates it from the '"orkers cooperative idea". ment of Steinherr and Thisse(83,84),labour-managed cooperatives 
Thus the scheme depends upon the unrestricted ability of employers would again exhibit employment stability. These points generalize 
to hire as much labour as they wish, and would be undermined if the conclusions of Ireland and Law(259) concerning participatory 
participating workers were to attempt to restrict new hires in or- firms,to the case of producer cooperatives operating in a full 
der to boost their own incomes deriving from the profit sharing employment environment. 
element. The potential incentive effects of profit sharing 
At this point we should mention a similarly astringent schemes have led in practice to their introduction on a limited 
scheme which was proposed in the nineteenth century by scale in a number of western economies. According to Hollander and 
Hertzka(546),(see Chilosi,223 for a full discussion) in which a Lacroix(282), their use would be more •o'lidespread if it '"ere not 
mirror image share system was proposed. Here it is workeJ\,s who for the fact that they alter the distribution of information con-
have unrestricted rights to enter into producer cooperativ~• of cerning a firm's true profitability so as to reduce assymetries in 
their choice. In such an economy, earnings (but not labour mar- its distribution, and this makes employers reluctant ~o inplement 
ginal products)are equalized throughout the economy through free such schemes in case labour's bargaining power is thereby 
labour mobility.The full employment equilibrium, being based upon increased. On the other hand, when profitability is low, such dis-
a participatory foundation, is not subject to the institutional closure of information may be to management's advantage if it 
instabilities of the sha~e economy of Weitzman and Vanek. Finally, induces workers to revise their bargaining position in the light 
-48-
of ne'" realities. Fitzroy and Kraft ( 278) present some empirical 
evidence suggestive of a positive relationship between profit-
sharing and profitability in West Germany. Various studies of the 
impact of profit sharing on productivity in western producer 
cooperatives have also emerged suggesting a similar positive 
relationship between profit sharing schemes and enterprise 
performance(see part 2), whilst the essential theoretical con-
siderations relating to the incentive effects of various types of 
sharing systems and enterprise performance in a participatory con-
text have already been described in section 4. 
\ 
i ; 
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B. Workers • investment funds 
Whilst the enterprise level profit sharing schemes have 
been the focus of the most recent debate, a separate set of 
proposals for economy-•"ide profit-sharing schemes have also 
received considerable attention in a number of western European 
countries, notably Denmark and Sweden, under the title of 
•workers' investment funds". These schemes are based upon an idea 
originally put for•,ard by Keynes and propose a system in '"hich 
either a share of profits (the 'profit-sharing' variant) or a 
share of the wage bill (the 'investment wage' variant) would be 
allocated to a central fund; the former being essentially perfo~-
mance related, the latter more in the nature of a fixed payment. 
The fund ~ould allocate non-negotiable shares to employees covered 
by the scheme which would be redeemable at a future date at a 
price which would reflect the face value plus any capital gains or 
losses and di ''id end payments. Since the fund '"ould be managed by 
employee representatives, it would introduce an element of 
economy-wide codetermination into the ~anagement of invest~ent 
finance decisions, without necessarily increasing the risk to 
emplyers that their plant level managerial autonomy would be 
diluted through an extension of employee participation ~ithin 
enterprises. The main purpose of the scheme, apart from its role 
in diversifying capital ownership, is to separate, at a macro-
economic lev~l 1 the decisions over income distribution from those 
over accumulation and growth (Burkitt,275,276J. Where unions are 
able to bargain over both wage increases and the contribution made 
I I 
!r 
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by employers to the workers' investment funds, they may be tempted 
to moderate their claims for current wage increases, in return for 
a defferred wage in the form of fund certificates and the promise 
of a degree of codetermination at the economy wide level which the 
existence and growth of the fund promises to them. Analysis of the 
economic effects of such profit sharing schemes has been conducted 
at the microeconomic level by Atkinson(270). He presents a model 
of a private firm where ownership and control are separated. 
Managers are interested in growth, and both unions and management 
may benefit (at the expense of current shareholders) from the im-
plementation of the scheme since a lower current wage bill enables 
the firm to grow more quickly, whilst at ·the same time workers 
gain from the future dividends which faster growth provides. The 
macroeconomic implications of the scheme are analysed by 
Brems(272,27J) who considers a standard one-sector growth model 
and shows through numerical simulation experiments that aggregate 
savings and investment would be raised by the introduction of the 
scheme for 'reasonable' guesses on parameter values. George(281) 
extends Brems' analysis to derive conditions under which the fund 
HOuld grow or diminish over time. Whist Simple growth models of 
this type have a somewhat 'mechanical' flavour, a more sophisti-
cated analysis is possible through the use of dynamic diffe~'ential 
game models of the type discussed by Pohjola(289), where elements 
of strategic interaction between diffent social classes over dis-
tribution and accumulation decisions can be tackled. In the 
absence of the scheme,and where savings and investment decisions 
are undertaken by different social classes ( •workers• and 
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•capitalists' l - because, for example most corporate investment is 
internally financed or their is an absence of enterprise level 
worker participation in financial decisions - the only way workers 
may exercise independent control over the intertemporal distribu-
tion decision, (i.e. the only way they can make real future wage 
gains) is to moderate their current real claims in the hope that 
capitalists will reinvest their profits so as to raise the total 
income available for future redistribution. However, if they do 
not trust that the capitalists will reinvest their profits then 
their optimal strategy is to press for maximum current wages. 
Pohjola shows that the introduction of a workers' investment fund 
scheme would modify the dynamic behaviour of the system in such a 
way as to produce a higher level of savings and investment, and a 
higher long run rate of growth which is beneficial to both classes 
of society. 
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Part 2. European experience 
9.General overview 
An increasing number of firms all over Europe is being 
managed and controlled in a participatory manner, and these tes-
tify to the variety of institutional forms which labour-managed 
and participatory firms can take: from the socialist labour-
managed firm in Yugoslavia, to different forms of cooperatives in 
western industrialized economies, and participatory profit-sharing 
enterprises such as the West German eo-determined firm. 
Particularly since the recession in 1974, there has been a rapid 
growth of cooperative firms in many countries and a resurgence of 
interest in the cooperative movement, and it is producer coopera-
tives that have been growing much faster than any other type. In 
1981, there were some 14,000 producer cooperatives in the European 
Economic Community, employing some 520,000 workers (Estrin, 299). 
If they continue to increase at the current rate, producer 
cooperatives are expected to constitute an important third sector 
alongside private enterprises and state enterprises (CEC, 440). 
Cooperatives have been created either by rescues of declining 
capitalist firms, by handovers of existing firms from pub~ic or 
private hands to workers, or by creations from scratch. \ 
tive, 
There is no generally accepted definition of a coopera-
as the term refers to diverse organisational forms. 
Nevertheless, a producer cooperative is usually considered an en-
terprise owned or controlled by the labour force, in which workers 
participate in firm management, share in the distribution of net 
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income, and earn a limited return on capital (Estrin, Jones, 
svejnar 300, and Estrin 299). Most existing cooperatives usually 
conform with the principles formalised by the International 
Cooperative Alliance in 1966, based on those enunciated by the 
"Rochdale Pioneers" in 1844: l)open and voluntary membership; 
2)democratic control of the firm, on the basis of one member, one 
vote regardless ~f differences in members• individual capital 
shares; 3)limited interest paid on share capital; 4)equitable dis-
tribution of the surplus on the basis of work done; 5)cooperatives 
should devote a part of their surplus to education; and 
6)cooperatives should cooperate amongst themselves. 
The major shortfall of existing economic literature on 
the labour-managed firm is a scarcity of careful empirical work. 
Apart from a number of descriptive studies offering an insight 
into the institutional and legal characteristics of the coopera-
t i ve sector, their ideological background and historical roots, 
little has appeared in the field of testing hypotheses from 
labour-management theory, and comparing the economic performance 
of cooperatives with private firms. Nevertheless, important con-
tributions are beginning to appear, using highly developed 
techniques and formal indicators of workers participation, '"hich 
estimate the 1mpact of •Horkers • participation on economic 
performance. 
In our surve_J,., we will concentrate on those countries 
which are most representative of producers' cooperatives in Europe 
today, namely France, Italy, Spain, United ~ingdom and Yugoslavia, 
as 
these are the ex?eriences of labour-management to which the 
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largest parf of applied work refers, and on which recently emerg-
ing empirical contributions have almost exclusively been based. 
However, it is to be noted that some interesting empirical work 
has also been done on workers' cooperatives in other countries, 
including Denmark (George, 310) and Sweden (Thordasson, 346). 
10. France 
The growth of the cooperative sector in France was as-
-sociated with the revolutionary upheavals of 1848 and the Paris 
Commune, and as such had its roots in socialist ideology. Rapid 
growth continued during the 20th century, and today, the French 
producer cooperative sector is after Italy, the second largest in 
the Western world. The number of workers' cooperatives has been 
rising steadily particularly during the 1970's: from around 20 per 
year in 1970, to 30 in 1975 and 120 in 1979 (CEC, 440). In 1981, 
there were around 1000 producers' cooperatives in France, employ-
ing about 30 thousand people, and by 1984 their number has risen 
further to 1,300 employing more than 40 thousand workers (see 
Vienney, 473, 474; CEC, 440; Defourny et. al, 315; Estrin, 299). 
The first supporting organisation appeared in 1884, 
which in 1937 became the Confederation Generale des Soci~te des 
Co-operatives Ouvrieres de Production (SCCP). The Confede}ation 
Generale des SCOP is the sole organisation representing worker 
cooperatives in France. Its aims are to spread the principles of 
cooperation, offer advise and provide training for members of 
cooperatives, and to defend their interests. Within the 
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confederation, cooperatives are grouped on both a geographical and 
a sectoral basis (see Liaison Sociales, 471). 
Whereas prior to 1914 most cooperatives were in sectors 
with a strong central trade union organisation, since then the 
majority have been in the building and public works fields and 
other areas with weak trade union organisation (Antoni, 313). 
Today, most French producers' cooperatives are in construction and 
engineering, 44% and 16% respectively (1982 figures), and most of 
them are relatively small, employing less than fifteen ~.-~orkers: in 
1982, 45% employed fewer than 9 workers, only around 7% employed 
more than 100 wor~ers and almost none more than 1000 (Estrin, 299) 
over the period 1977-82, 60% of new cooperatives were created from 
scratch, whereas 29% were rescues and the remainder conver5ions. 
For further details, see Demoustier, 466, 467; Desroche, 316, 468; 
Estrin, 299; Oakeshott, 453; Thornley, 472, 457; CEC, 440. 
Whereas the history and ideology of the French coopera-
tive movement indicate its formal commitment to the idea of worker 
solidary, Batstone (314) places French cooperatives somewhere be-
t•,een 11 solida~ity collectives .. and "democracies of small 
capitalists .. , as elements of both are present in the existing 
cooperative constitution, in spite of extreme diversity in the 
legal form of firms and the rules to which they are subject. On 
the one hand, individual shareholding is obligatory (although the 
minimum stake is very small), worker-members can invest personally 
in the cooperati?e via an assortment of financial instruments, 
outside shareholders are permitted and non-members can be hired. 
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On the other hand, cooperative regulations usually include impor-
tant constraints. Shares may be sold only at their nominal value 
and may not be paid back to shareholders if this would reduce 
capital below one-quarter of its highest value; outside 
shareholders cannot represent more than one third of the board of 
J 
directors; and the interest on capital paid to shareholders is 
limited to 6%. Collective funds are obligatory (at least 15% of 
profits must be allocated to the cooperatives' reserve fund), and 
in case of dissolution the capital is nondivisable and must be 
donated to another cooperative. The balance between individual and 
collective capital however, varies significantly across sectors; 
Estrin, Jones and Svejnar (300) report that individual ownership 
acc0unted for only 30% in the French construction sector, but al-
most 60% in the French electrical sector. 
Democratic management procedures include voting among 
members on the basis of one-man, one-vote, irrespective of 
capital; the sharing in profits by all workers in proportion to 
work done, though a collective decision determines the actual 
proportion to be distributed; and the possibility for members to 
elect and dismiss managers at any time (see Batstone, 314; 
Oakeshott, 453; Thornley, 457). In practice, not all wor~ers 
choose to become members of a cooperative. Until the late 1~50's, 
the overall average proportion of members ••as 55% (Antoni, 313); 
in the post-1968 period, around 60% of total employees ·•ere mem-
bers (Batstone, 314); while in 1978, only some 47% of workers in 
French cooperatives were members (Estrin, 299). 
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Batstone (314) tested a number of general hypotheses by 
examining the performance of a sample of 60 cooperatives relative 
to the industrial averages. The evidence points to superior per-
formance of cooperatives. Value of capital equipment per worker 
was found to be higher, and the employment records seemed to be 
superior: between 1970 and 1975 construction cooperatives in-
creased employment by 5%, while in industry it fell by over 12%. 
cooperative work experience seemed to be superior (lower level of 
supervision and greater sense of commitment), while differentials 
between the highest and lowest paid wages were much smaller than 
in industry generally (the highest was 5:1). Finally, cooperatives 
••ere able to survive for longer per lads than the typical pr i va t'e 
firm, as cooperatives are predominantly concerned with their own 
survival and seek to ensure an especially long-term perspective. 
(On issues of survival, see also Vienney, 473; and Perotin, 319). 
While some of these findings are also supported by SCOP 
statistics, according to which cooperatives have demonstrated a 
superior record of output growth since 1945, the most exhaustive 
empirical study undertaken on French cooperatives is the one by 
Defourny, Estrin and Jones (315). The authors use enterprise 
level data from about 550 French producer cooperatives in 1978 and 
1979, in the search for an association between output and IJarious 
measures of the degree of participation when factor in~uts and 
•farious possible determinants of the le•1el of output have been 
taken into account. Value added is found to be an increasing func-
tion of participation in profits, in collective membership and in 
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ownership, even when a wide range of enterprise specific and en-
vironmental factors are taken into account. The results prove to 
be robust, surviving various statistical tests, the typical 
productivity effect from participation in an average French 
cooperative being around 5% of output in 1979. 
11. Italy 
The first Italian producer cooperative was formed in 
1856, and by the end of the 19th century there were some 600 
producer cooperatives in existence. Producer cooperatives ex-
perienced rapid growth especially in the early 20th century, with 
the creation of cooperatives in glass making, printing and en-
gineering, but also during the period of reconstruction following 
the second world war (see Briganti, 481; Degli Innocenti, 484; 
Zevi, 329; CEC, 440; Jones, Zevi, 322). 
However, it is since the economic crisis of the early 
1970's that producer cooperatives in Italy have experienced their 
most rapid growth: over the 1970-78 period the number of producer 
cooperatives more than doubled, from 6,679 to 14,207, and by 1981, 
the total had increased to more than 19,000 (Jones and Zevi, 322). 
Today, Italy is believed to have some 20 thousand pro
1
ducers' 
cooperatives providing about 200 thousand jobs, and as iuch is 
both the largest and the fastest growing sys~em of producers 
cooperatives in the industrialized western ·•orld. Not only does 
Italy have more workers' cooperatives than the rest of Western 
Europe put together, but the cooperative sector in Italy had 
around 80% of the total number of cooperative employees in the EEC 
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(CEC, 440; Estrin, 299). Although service cooperatives have during 
197o's experienced rapid growth, Italian cooperatives today the 
are concentrated in construction and manufacturing: the Lega 
cooperatives alone accounted for 8% of the national market in 
building and construction in 1980, while in several other fields 
such as the manufacture of pottery, woodwork finishings, glass 
making and certain mechanical engineering activities, cooperatives 
market shares of about 10% (Jones and Zevi, 322; for further have 
details, see also Briganti, 481; Fabbri, 486; Stroppa 497, 498; 
Verrucoli, 327; and Zan, 499, 328) · 
The supporting structure of Italian cooperatives is the 
most highly developed in Europe. Italian cooperatives are af-
filiated to three representative bodies: the "Federazione delle 
Societa Cooperative Italiane", created in 1885, which in 1893 
changed its name to "Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e ~lutue", 
1 b the communist, Socialist and Republican supported predominant Y Y 
· delle Cooperative Italiane" established Party; the "Confederaz1one 
in 1919 and supported by the Christian Democratic Party; and the 
"Associazione Generale delle cooperative Italiane" founded in 1952 
and supported by the social Democratic and Republican Party (see 
Thornley, 329; Zan, 499). Italian cooperatives are informally 
classified into "red .. , u.11hit~" and 11 green" accordlli~ to their ad-
herence to the above associations, al~hough only one third of all 
Italian cooperatives belong to these associations. Cooperative 
Consortia, unique to the Italian system of cooperatives, are 
unions of cooperatives which provide cooperatives with services of 
---- l 
i 
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a varied nature and have local, regional, national or interna-
tional responsibilities. Since 1947 a special credit institute for 
Italian cooperatives exists, a section of the Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro. 
The Lega is the most representative of the organisations 
as far as production cooperatives are concerned, having a member-
ship, of over 3000 producer cooperatives in 1981 (Jones and Zevi, 
322), accounting for around half of all producer cooperatives in 
Italy affiliated to one of the associations.The Lega cooperatives 
have also experienced the most rapid increase in number, the an-
nual average of ne'" cooperatives over the 1970-79 period being 
around 200 per year. The t~o national associations for producers' 
cooperatives within the Lega are the ANCPL for worker coopera-
tives, and the ANCS for service cooperatives. The number of ANCPL 
cooperatives has more than doubled in 9 years, from 185 in 1970 to 
391 in 1979, creating a total of 8,400 jobs, and at the end of 
1979, employed 18,500 workers, mainly in the sectors of building 
materials, tiles, bricks, wood~orK finishings, and ceramics; in 
prefabricated concrete products, they held 24% of the national 
market, while in woodwork finishings, 17%. The ANCS cooperatives 
are moi:e numerous however, 1,100 in 1979, employing\ 55,000 
' 
'"orkers, of ·•hich 807 are construction cooperatives (CEC•, 440; 
Estrin, 299; Zan, 499). 
Cooperatives affiliated to the Confederazione included 
some 2,339 producer cooperatives in 1981, or more than a third of 
producer cooperatives in Italy associated witn one of the 
associations. They are organised along similar lines to the Lega. 
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Production cooperatives are associated with the Federlavoro na-
tional federation, which includes some 1,632 production 
cooperatives, of which almost half are building cooperatives. 
Growth here has been most marked among industrial and service 
cooperatives (CEC, 440; Zan, 499). 
Producer cooperatives affiliated to the Associazione are 
the ,least numerous. They are found mainly in the housing sector 
and are mostly located in Southern Italy. Of the 1000 cooperatives 
belonging to this organisation in 1980, 630 were service c.oopera-
tives, 200 industrial and 170 production cooperatives (CEC, 440). 
The largest part of Italian producer cooperatives (40%) 
are concentrated in the regions of Emilia Romagna, Campania and 
Sicilia. During 1972-1981, all regions have ~itnessed growth in 
the number of cooperatives, but the fastest growth was recorded in 
the central region of Italy (Zan, 499; Jones and Zevi, 322). 
Cooperative legislation in Italy is guided by the recog-
nized principles of cooperatives belonging to the International 
Cooperative Alliance: one member, one vote; free and voluntary 
membership; and limited remuneration of underwritten capital. 
There must be no fewer than nine members (for cooperatives that 
participate in public contracts, no fewer than 25 members). Only 
workers can generally ba members, and while membership is not 
obligatory 1 most workers do choose to become members. ~1embership 
fees are normally required, but may not exceed a value of 4 mil-
lion lire (2 million for ser7ice cooperatives); members' shares 
cannot be remunerated at a rate higher than 5%, and in case of 
withdrawal, a me~ber is repaid only the book value of his share. 
1 1,1 
I lj I, 1t 
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Members may ·make internal loans to their cooperative, but are 
limited to a maximum amount of 30 million lire. Cooperatives must 
deposit no less than 20% of the current year's profits in a legal 
rese.rve fund; collectively owned reserves are exempt from cor-
porate income tax, and in case of disolution, as in France, must 
be handed over to another cooperative. The total of the dividends 
dist~ibuted must be less than half the profits made (for details, 
see CEC, 440; Paolucci, 494; Zan, 499). 
One of the recent contributions on Italian cooperatives 
is the study by Jones and Zevi (322), who compared for 1975-79 the 
growth rate of large producers' cooperatives in construction and 
manufacturing, the Ravenna cooperatives, and where possible, 
private firms. The evidence suggests that during the late 1970's, 
Italian cooperatives grew at rates that sometimes outstripped 
capitalist firms, as they enjoyed faster rates of growth of sales, 
value added and fixed assets. In terms of sales 3 cooperatives, 
while in terms of profits 23 cooperatives ranked in the top 500 
firms in Italy. Cooperatives could also be compared with the job 
creating abilities of private firms: for large Lega cooperatives, 
jobs were created at annual rates of 7.6% and 5.3% in construction 
and manufacturing, respectively, '"hile corresponding privati' firms 
registered a decline of -0.7% and -0.1%. This sample of cobpera-
tives also recorded better rates of profit and maybe higher levels 
of productivity, although considerable differences were found be-
tween cooperatives in construction and those in manufacturing. 
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An even more impressive employment record in Lega 
cooperatives is reported in a survey of 304 cooperatives, under-
taken by the Lega Association (489): over the 1975-78 period, in 
manufacturing industry cooperatives, there was a 10.5% growth in 
the number of employees (or 16.2% of members), as compared with a 
sample of private firms which registered a decline of 6.1%; for 
const>uction cooperatives, a 22.4~ growth of employees (or 16.7% 
of members) was recorded, as compared to -4.7% in private firms. 
The Lega has undertaken other surveys which offer rich statistical 
on the Italian cooperative sector, the latest of which is on data 
cooperatives in Emilia Romagna (Lega, 490), and some good case 
studies on Italian producer cooperatives have also appeared 
l 477,· Peloso, 325; Modoro, 32~; recently (see Bollini et a ., 
Nazarro, 493; Fabbri, 486). 
In a recent study on Italian producer cooperatives a 
frame work is used to estimate the productivity production function 
effects of worker participation in management, profit-sharing, 
worker ownership, worker loan capital and the size of the raserve 
fund, using firm-level data for Italian manufacturing and con-
struction producer cooperatives (Jones, Svejnar, 323). The results 
of the regression analysis, based on data from a sample of Lega 
cooperatives with sales in excess of the equivalent of one million 
dollars, indicated that profit-sharing, workers' participation and 
individual worker ownership of assets have a positive or at least 
a non-negative effect on productivity, whilst collective~y owned 
reserves have a negative effect on productivity. 
12. Soain 
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The Mondragon group of er.terprises in the Basque 
province in Northern Spain is often considered the most successful 
example of the viability of producers' cooperatives, although the 
Italian case is, as we have seen, equally impressive. The 
Mondragon group originated in technical education classes started 
in 1943, under the influence and inspiration of a Basque Catholic 
priest, and a small firm was set up in 1956. The number of 
cooperatives increased to 30 in 1965, and to 40 in 1970, while 
average employment from less than 50 in 1960, to over lOO in 1965, 
and to over 200 in 1970. By 1980, Mondragon had developed into a 
system of some 70 producers' cooperatives, with over 15,000 mem-
bers, providing, in 1979, 12.5 per cent of the industrial 
employment in the province of Guipuzcoa. (For further details, see 
Oakeshott, 340, 341, 453; Gutierrez-Johnson, 337; Gutierrez-
Johnson and Whyte, 338; Eaten 335; Bradley and Gelb, 330, 331, 
332; Thomas, 342, 343; Thomas and Logan, 506, 507). 
A key feature of the Mondragon group of cooperatives is 
a well developed supporting structure. The Mondragon system in-
eludes not only basic production cooperatives, but also an 
integrated structure of service cooperatives, such as the social 
insurance organisation, a research and development unit, a t~chni-
\ 
others. However, the central role is played by cal and college, 
Mondragon's savings bank, the Caja Laboral Popular (CLP), to which 
cooperatives are linked by a contract of association. The CLP 
mobilises the savings of its 300,000 members, and provides the 
bulk of the group's financing. It was formally constituted in 1959 
in order to provide a legal guarantee for the capital received 
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from the community, and is permitted to give credit only to its 
members. Thomas and Logan (507) have presented some basic in-
dicators on the performance of the CLP, and these figures 
demonstrate rapid growth over the last twenty years: the balance 
between capital and reserves in the CLP's own resources shifted 
from 0.95:0.05 in 1965 to 0.38:0.62 in 1979. According to most 
repor~, the CLP ha~ played an important role in Mondragon, and 
has contributed to its economic success. 
Industrial enterprises used to account for more than 80% 
of all Mondragon undertakings, wheras today, around 64%, and these 
include Spain•s leading producers of domestic appliances and 
machine tools. Initially, the sector of heavy machinery was the 
most important provider of employment, while today, it is the con-
sumer durable sector; the machine-tool group has shown the 
greatest relative improvement in profitability, although the 
consumer-durable group is still the most profitable, in spite of a 
decline in its share of group profits (Stephen, 427). Most 
cooperatives are small to medium in size; the exception is one 
cooperative which employs over 3,000 workers. The largest part 
produce commodities that are of medium capital intensit?, although 
highly capital-intensive products are also found (such as 
petrochemicals). 
The contract ~f association stresses that all workers 
must be members and entries to the cooperative should not be 
restricted. Cooperatives must create collectively owned reserves 
to which a minimum of 20~ of net profits must be allocated, and 
they must also contribute 10% of net profits to a social fund 
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devoted to cooperative projects in the community. Although for-
mally all workers should also be members, in practice hiring of 
non-member workers does take place. A new member must put up a 
significant capital contribution as a membership fee, 15% of which 
is allocated to the cooperative's reserves, the remainder being 
credited to individual capital accounts on which they receive only 
a fixed rate of interest. In contrast with the French and Italian 
cooperatives, individual capital accounts are revalued annually. 
The system of wages in Mondragon is based on three 
solidarity principles: wages are related to those in capitalist 
firms in their immediate environment; a common system for deter-
mining wages is used in all Mondragon cooperatives; and finally, 
wage differentials within a cooperative are restricted to the 
ratio of 3:1. Top salaries in Mondragon in 1974 were about a third 
of those of a director in a comparable private firm (see 
Gutierrez-Johnson, 337; Thomas, 342; and Thomas and Logan, 507). 
Several studies have indicated that the results achieved 
by Mondragon cooperatives are at least as good as those achieved 
elsewhere in Spain. Using various indicators, Thomas (343) found 
that productivity and profitability were higher for cooperatives 
than for private firms. Thomas and Logan (506, 507) ev~luated 
\ 
their performance in terms of sales, value added, exports, irlvest-
ment, productivity, profitability, and financial position, in 
comparison to private enterprises in the surrounding provinces in 
the Basque region of Spain. They conclude that in aggregate, the 
Mondragon group outperformed the reference group of private firms 
in terms of growth, produccivity, and profitability. Levin (339) 
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reports that in 1972, Mondragon cooperatives were using capital 
and labour more efficiently than the average of the largest five 
hundred firms in Spain. Jones (304) uses more than a dozen in-
dicators to design a typology of producer cooperatives and to 
evaluate their economic and social performance, and compares the 
Mondragon group favourably with other cooperatives in the western 
world., Bradley and Gelb (330, 331, 332, 500) have undertaken sur-
veys of cooperatives in ~londragon, and found that a generally 
favorable picture of the Mcndragon experiment emerges, as it 
demonstrates advantages of a cooperative economy, and especially 
very impressive employment record: over the period 1975-80, the 
a 
group created some 4,000 jobs, an increase in employment of some 
25%. However, the same authors in a later study (Bradley and Gelb, 
1985, quoted in Estrin, 299) report that since 1980, employment in 
the Mondragon group has been falling, by around 500 workers up to 
1983. 
Much of the analysis of the Mondragon experience has 
been undertaken in a somewhat acritical fashion however, and the 
current difficulties which face the group clearly point to the 
need for an application of the more rigorous type of economic 
analysis which has recently been applied to the Italian, U.K. and 
French experiences. 
13.United Kingdom 
workers• cooperatif1es in the United Kingdom have their 
origins in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
their number peaking in 1893 at a total of 113 (Jones, 355; for 
-68-
details, see also Thornley, 457). From the beginning of the 20th 
century their number has steadily declined, and it is only in the 
1960's that new worker cooperatives began to be formed, and only 
after 1975 that there was a major growth in their number. Between 
1976 and 1980, U.K. cooperatives had the fastest increase among 
cooperatives in •t~estern countries, as their number rose by almost 
ten times with some 250 new cooperatives established (see Estrin, 
299; CDA, 511, 512). While in 1975 there were only 30 coopera-
tives registered with the model rules of the Industrial Common 
Ownership Movement (ICOM), their number had increased to over 400 
by May 1982. The Cooperative Development Agency (CDA) recorded a 
total of approximately 329 worker cooperatives in 1980; by 1982 
this total had increased to approximately 480; and by June 1984, 
there were 911 cooperatives in the United Kingdom, employing al-
most 9,000 workers (CDA, 512). 
The vast majority of worker cooperatives are new firms: 
during the 1975-1981 period, some 90% of new cooperatives were 
formed from scratch, and there were practically no conversions of 
traditional organisational forms into cooperatives. Most of the 
new cooperatives are very small in terms of the number of workers 
employed, often not exceeding 10 workers (see Wilson, 460). 
According to the CDA Directory (512), more than 70% of exis'e·ing 
cooperatives employ less than 10 ••orkers, while only one coopera-
tive had more than 500 'tlorkers. Coope::atives have mostly been 
established in the service sector, particularly in retailing, 
catering and food producing (over 30%), printing and publishing 
(around 20t), distributive trades or in craft related industries 
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and light manufacturing (see CDA, 511, 512; CEC, 440; Cornforth, 
351). 
The traditional British cooperative support organisation 
is the cooperative Productive Federation (CPF), founded in 1882, 
bringing together both industrial cooperatives and provident 
societies (see Jones, 354, 355, 356; and Jones and Backus, 357). 
However. cooperatives affiliated with the CPF suffered a marked 
decline in number from the Second World War onwards, and had 
diminished to 17 firms employing 1,600 workers in 1970. By 1980, 
there were only 8 traditional producer cooperatives affiliated to 
the CPF, and the organisation amalgamated with the Cooperative 
union, which itself had only 9 members in 1981 (CEC, ~40). 
It is believed that the recent growth of the U.K. 
cooperative sector is associated with the formation of new 
cooperative support organisations (Estrin, 299). The new support 
organisations which emerged during the 1970s were rear~, the 
Industrial common c••nership Movement, and CDA, the Cooperative 
Development Agency, with its 40 local Cooperative Development 
Agencies which play an important role in sponsoring new coopera-
tives (Cornforth, 351; CEC, 440). 
Oakshott (453) classified U.K. cooperatives into three 
categories. The first group are the ''cloth-cap cooperatives'', or 
long established cooperatives, with their origins often prior to 
1914, associated with the Cooperative Union, and prior to its 
demise, the cooperative Productive Federation. The. number of these 
cooperatives has Eallen steadily: from 71 in 1913, to 26 in 1970 
(Oakshott, 453), while Jones (356) gives an estimate of 17 for 
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1975. The second group are those associated '"i th the ICOM, or who 
have adopted ICOM-type rules, which are now enshrined in the 
Industrial Common Ownership Act of 1976. Whereas in 1977 there 
were 10 major ICOM companies with 1,200 members (Oakshot, 453), by 
the end of august 1981, their number had increased to 350, forming 
at the rate of two cooperatives a week (CEC, 440). The third group 
identif~ed by Oakshott are the ill-fated Wedgewood-Benn coopera-
tives, formed in an attempt to preserve employment after the 
closure of privately owned firms in the mid 1970's; the three en-
terprises involved are Meriden Motorcycle, Scottish Daily News 
(see Bradley and Gelb, 349) and KMB. 
The rules of the ICOM and the CPF differ in a number of 
important respects (CEC, 440). According to ICOM rules, sharehold-
ing is limited to one !-pound share per member, while according to 
CPF rules, there was no maximum shareholding except for the legal 
maximum (5,000 pounds in 198l).The second important difference is 
that ICOM rules insist that only workers should be members and 
that all workers should be members. By contrast, only around 40% 
of workers in CPF cooperatives are members. The CPF rules 
initially allowed outside shareholding and many productive 
cooperatives relied on outside shareholders; however, following 
\ 
strong criticism, the rule was abolished in 1978 and shareholdings 
are now restricted to workers. The third main difference is that 
ICOM rules prohibit the distribution to members of any residual 
assets in case of closure, and these should be transferred to 
another common ownership, or similar organisation. 
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However, according to both sets of rules, voting is 
usually on a one-member, one-vote basis, regardless of shares, and 
substantial part of capital is collectively owned. Whereas ICOM 
rules are such that practically all capital is collectively owned, 
and they strongly recommend collective savings without any member 
participation in the growth of assets, the situation is not much 
different in CPF cooperatives: apart from the legal requirements 
for minimal individual holdings, the remainder of the assets is 
held in collective form, and Jones and Backus (357) report that 
most investment is financed by retained earnings which cannot be 
recovered by individual employees. Estrin, Jones and Svejnar 
(300) found that individual ownership only accounted for around 4% 
of the total assets in the British CPFs in 1968. 
The largest part of empirical work on U.K. cooperatives 
has been concentrated on long-established cooperatives (for a 
review of empirical work, see cornforth, 351). A number of factors 
have been blamed for the failure of many of the traditional 
producer cooperatives in the U.K.: undercapitalisation, lack of 
management and business skills, lack of discipline and poor 
relationships between management and workers (Thornley, 457). 
Early works by the Webbs (517, 518) suggested that producer 
cooperatives would either fail as businesses or degenerate into 
non cooperative forms. These pessimistic claims were systemati-
cally examined only recently by Jones (303, 355), who looked at 
the survival rate, performance and levels of participation in 
traditional producer cooperatives, bet••een 1385 and 1963. The 
evidence suggests that producer cooperatives can survi7e for long 
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periods of t"ime, in a manner which compares favourably '"i th con-
ventional companies (Jones, 355). As to the efficiency of producer 
cooperatives, Jones examined the comparative performance of 
producer cooperatives with equivalent private firms, and concluded 
that no comparative advantage '"as apparent as there '"as no consis-
tent relationship between the diverse indicators of labour 
efficiency and participation (Jones, 303). Nevertheless, the 
generalconclusion of Jones' studies is that cooperatives can per-
form at least as well as similar private companies. Success was 
not necessarily achieved at the expense of degenerating into non-
cooperative forms. 
Jones and Backus (357) tested hypotheses derived from 
Vanek's (214) theory of financing for British producer coopera-
tives in footwear existing between 1948 and 1968, in order to 
examine the consequences of internal financing. Estimating produc-
tion functions and using several measures of participation, 
support was found for the proposition that participation improves 
productivity (although participation coefficients varied much be-
tween classes and with functional form). However, the average 
footwear cooperative '"as smaller than the average firm in the 
footwear industry, and private firms were growing at a faster raqe 
than cooperatives. These results are broadly consistent with th~-
predictions of an underinvestment effect associated with the 
Cornell School approach (see section 85). However, the study has 
been critisized on statistical and methodological grounds by 
Stephen (427) and should not be regarded as conclusive. 
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Another recent study, by Wilson (360), based on a survey 
of 72 worker cooperatives in the U.K., showed that workers 
f h typ ical problems of new businesses. cooperatives suffered rom t e 
Obtaining finance was seen as the crucial problem both in the 
period of setting up the enterprise, and afterwards, while others 
included obtaining and keeping sales outlets, and finding and 
keeping ~he appropriate skills. These findings are also supported 
by a similar survey by Chaplin and Cowe (350),who however found 
finance was not such an important current problem that obtaining 
(see Cornforth, 351). 
14. Yugoslavia 
The theory on the labour-managed firm originally 
developed with the the Yugoslav labour-managed firm in mind (Ward, 
89)' and as the most extensive system of labour-managed firms 
which extends throughout the largest part of 
the economy, 
Yugoslavia has also been a common area of empirical research. 
With its origins in the early 1950's when the first 
'Horkers • councils in a limited number of firms were formed, 
Yugoslav self-management has passed through different phases of 
f h . h associated with the introduction of 'its development, each o w 1c 
economic reforms: the 1952-65 period of partial self-management, 
the 1965-72 period of market self-management, and the period after 
1972 of regulated self-management. During the first of these 
periods, a decentralized mechanism repla~ed central planning, but 
central government control over income distribution; prices, for-
eign trade transactions and investment 'Has retained, leaving 
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little autonomy to enterprises. In the period following the 1965 
economic reform, decentralisation was extended to other sectors, 
including the banking system, investment, and foreign trade,and 
these changes ran parallel with the adoption of a more liberal 
price policy, increased reliance on the market mechanism, and 
decline in fiscal burdens on firms so as to increase their 
autonomy in the distribution of income. However, economic problems 
after 1965 (rising unemployment, inflation, balance of payments 
difficulties), led to a set of economic reforms in the early 
1970's, which introduced elements of regulation through the new 
mechanisms of 'social compacts' and 'self-management agreements', 
but at the same time, democratized the decision-making process by 
splitting enterprises into smaller economic units. 
The available extensive literature on the evolution of 
the Yugoslav system of self-management offers an excellent insight 
into the differences in institutional structure, decision-making 
processes, role of plan and market, economic performance, and 
other characteristics of each of the periods mentioned above (see 
world Bank, 538, 539, 540; Lydall, 531: Horvat, 528; Sacks, 534; 
Comisso, 522; Jan Vanek, 536). Studies on the Yugoslav industrial 
structure and enterprise entry and exit (Sacks, 379, 380, 3\~1; 
\ 
Estrin, 523) show that Yugoslav product markets are highly 
concentrated. There has been relatively little new entry or exit 
of enterprises, in spite of the inc:ease in firm numbers; an ex-
planation offered by Estrin (523) is considerable diversification 
by existing firms into new product markets, which acts to reduce 
industrial concentration. 
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Empirical testing of hypotheses from self-management 
theory on Yugoslav data has been limited, and has mainly con-
centrated on problems of capital and labour misallocation (Estrin 
and Bartlett, 368). Most of these studies restrict the analysis to 
the 1965-72 period, as it is considered the only period which 
closely approximates the labour-managed market economy of self-
management theory- although an exception is Prasnikar (376, 377), 
who examines the behaviour of Yugoslav firms under the post-1974 
institutional arrangements. 
The bulk of empirical work on Yugoslavia has con-
centrated on wage determination. Wachtel (389, 537) analysed the 
changes in average earnir.gs for different skill groups, republics, 
and sectors in the 1956-69 period. The ratio between the lowest 
and highest incomes in the different skill groups increased until 
1961, but declined thereafter, and similar movements were observed 
in the dispersion of average wages between different republics; as 
to the average wage dispersion among sectors, it steadily in-
creased over the entire period. This last result is supported by 
Estrin•s (366) findings, who makes inte=national comparisons ~f 
income dispersion in Yugoslavia and other economies for the period 
1956-1975 and finds that it was higher in Yugoslavia than in other 
countries, and higher in the period of market self-management than 
during the planned period (although the statistical basis of this 
comparison is contested by Lydall, 531). The evidence broadly con-
firms however, that not only '#ere there large differences between 
the incomes paid for identical jobs 'n different industrial sec-
tors, and that there was considerable ~ariation in incomes over 
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time, but also that there was substantial income dispersion within 
sectors and within industries (see also Estrin 365; Miovic, 375; 
Rivera-Batiz, 378; Staellerts 384). These results suggest that 
after 1965, incomes had become endogenous to the firm, rather than 
a market-determined parameter, and are therefore broadly consis-
tent with propositions from self-management theory. 
As to the primary source of Yugoslav income differen-
tials, the hypothesis that they are associated with the long run 
equilibrium of a self-managed economy in the absence of entry 
(exit) of new (old) firms, has been characterised by Estrin and 
Bartlett (368) as the "labour school" view. On the other hand, the 
•capital school" approach places emphasis on capital market imper-
fections which generate long-run disequilibria due to the 
underpricing of capital and its inefficient non-price rationing. 
Different estimates of the extent to which rents imputable to the 
arbitrary allocation of capital are distributed in the form of 
personal incomes are provided by Vanek and Jovicic (388); 
Staellerts (382); and Miovic (375), and is found to be a sig-
nificant causal factor in the explanation of income differentials. 
More recently, Estrin and Svejnar (369) provide econometric 
evidence which fails to refute either hypothesis, although capiefll \ 
rationing proved to be the largest single sourse Q~ income 
dispersion. Thus, both labor and capital market immobil~ies in 
-- ;7' 
Yugoslavia appear to.have been sufficient to prevent the eradica-
tion of labour marginal product differences between firms. 
Tyson ( 386) has examined the sa•Jings behaviour of 
Yugoslav firms. She suggests that Yugoslav enterprise income and 
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savings decisions can be explained by a permanent-income 
hypothesis, and shows that contrary to the predictions of the 
Texas School, enterprises saved a substantial proportion of their 
net income even after the reform: around 25% or more in all but 2 
of the 11 sectors that yielded statistically significant results. 
Although these findings have been questioned by Stephen (427), 
they are ,largely consistent with statistical evidence on savings 
in Yugoslavia (see Word Bank 538, 539, 540), and are also in-
directly supported by Gjurinek's (370) survey of 46 Yugoslav 
firms: whereas small firms regarded maximization of income per 
•,/Orker as their prime objective, medium and large firms viewed 
moderate accumulation and growth more important (on the issue of 
investment in Yugoslavia, see also Connock, 364). Recently, 
Bartlett (361) has considered the impact of fiscal policy on 
Yugoslav enterprise investment behaviour ~ithin the context of the 
self-management planning system which has been developed in recent 
years. 
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15. Conclusions 
The early theoretical literature on labour managed firms 
seemed to indicate that these types of firms were prone to in-
herent inefficiencies,ranging from 'perverse' responses to market 
price signals which would place limits on the employment creating 
abilities of such firms to possibly fatal underinvestment effects 
which would put limits upon the possible emergence of a 'third 
sector' of producer cooperatives in mixed economies, and even in-
he rent 'degenerative' tendencies which would frustrate the 
survival of such a sector if ever it were to emerge. 
However, wherever there are gains to be grasped from 
productive activity, human institutions seem to develop ways of 
adapting suitable structures within which such gains can be 
enjoyed. This insight is not ignored by conventional 'marginalist' 
economic theory, which in its more sophisticated variations 
proposes not only that the invisible hand of the market may 
operate so as to maximize social welfare within given institu-
tional constraints, but that the institutional constraints 
themselves are capable of adaptation through more or less 
\ 
transparent actions of economic agents. And indeed in this survey 
of the economic theory of participation in its various forms 
(labour-managed firms,employee participation and profit sharing 
schemes) we have seen repeatedly that possible alternative in-
stitutional solutions have been suggested which would overturn the 
more pessimistic predictions of the early rudimentary theories 
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based largely on overly simplistic theorizing,and on the principle 
of a mechanical analogy between profit-maximization and income-
per-head maximization. 
Moreover, the European experience with labour-managed 
firms, whether the producer cooperatives of weste~n Europe or the 
'self-managed' firms of the Yugoslav economy,has shown that a 
wide variety of institutional arrangements have been adopted in 
particular circumstances to suit the conditions prevailing in 
different countries. These experiences have shown that many of the 
institutional modifications suggested in the theoretical litera-
ture to improve the efficiency properties of the 'rudimentary' 
labour managed firm of early theory are commonly adopted in prac-
tical situations. They range from the admission of non-member 
workers to the charging of explicit or implicit membership fees 
which imply a departure from pure egalitarian principles,to the 
creation of supporting agencies which assist the formation of new 
firms,and to the implementation of internal loan schemes which 
support the capital accumulation prog~ammes of existing firms. In 
the special circumstances of the socialist economy of 
Yugoslavia,decentralized planning mechani5ms and extensi7e 
measures to regulate the behaviour of large labour managed in-
dustrial ol1gopolies have been adopted. The continued existence 
and growth of labour managed forms of economic organization in 
~urope under a variety of institutional settings therefore points 
to the accuracy of those developments in the theoretical litera-
ture which have sought to grapple with the tric~y questions of 
l'i I i, 
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appropriate institutional design of these non-orthodox types of 
economic organizations. 
At the same time there has been a curious assymetry in 
the development of the theoretical literature and the empirical 
studies, particularly in regard to the producer cooperatives. On 
the one hand the empirical work has hardly begun to address some 
of the central issues identified in the theoretical work, such as 
the hypotheses on supply reponse, on investment levels and finan-
cial structure or on entry conditions of new firms. On the other 
hand the main effort of empirical research, namely on the 
productivity-participation relationship has paid only cursory at-
tention to the large theoretical literature on incentive systems 
which addresses directly the question of effort supply and which 
is therefore of direct relevance to the productivity issue. In the 
absence of an adequate theoretical refe~ence point the findings of 
the empirical research in this area are rather difficult to 
interpret. For example, the theoretical models of incentive struc-
tures suggest that depending upon the particular type of 
remuneration system adopted, whether of the needs-related or work-
related type, equilibrium outcomes may give rise to either an 
under-supply or an over-supply of effort in relation to an ~f­
ficiency benchmark. Therefore the finding of a positi~e 
correlation between an participation index and a measure of 
productivity levels may merely indicate that members of a labour-
managed firm are putting in relatively too much effort - a 
sweatshop effect rather than that they are in some sense more 
efficient than comparable privately owned firms. 
-81-
~here is thus much scope for further progress in both 
theoretical and empirical studies of the economics of par-
ticipatory systems, both at the theoretical level,so as to take on 
board the wide variety of experience which has been accumulated in 
European developments in this area, and at the empirical level so 
as to provide answers to the many intriguing puzzles and 
hypotheses wnich have emerged from theoretical speculation. 
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